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Technology Prizes for Climate Change Mitigation

Author

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  • Newell, Richard

    () (Resources for the Future)

  • Wilson, Nathan

Abstract

We analyze whether technology inducement prizes could be a useful complement to standard research grants and contracts in developing climate change mitigation technologies. We find that there are important conceptual advantages to using inducement prizes in certain circumstances. These conceptual inferences are borne out by an examination of the track record of prizes inducing research into public goods, including relevant energy technologies. However, we also find that the prizes’ successes are contingent on their proper design. We analyze how several important design elements could influence the effectiveness of a climate technology prize.

Suggested Citation

  • Newell, Richard & Wilson, Nathan, 2005. "Technology Prizes for Climate Change Mitigation," Discussion Papers dp-05-33, Resources For the Future.
  • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-05-33
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    File URL: http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-05-33.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
    2. Palmer, Karen & Newell, Richard & Gillingham, Kenneth, 2004. "Retrospective Examination of Demand-side Energy-efficiency Policies," Discussion Papers dp-04-19, Resources For the Future.
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    4. Macauley, Molly & Davis, James, 2001. "An Economic Assessment of Space Solar Power as a Source of Electricity for Space-Based Activities," Discussion Papers dp-01-46, Resources For the Future.
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    7. Masters, William J., 2003. "Research Prizes: A Mechanism To Reward Innovation In African Agriculture," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22162, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June.
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    15. Wright, Brian Davern, 1983. "The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 691-707, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. de Coninck, Heleen & Fischer, Carolyn & Newell, Richard G. & Ueno, Takahiro, 2008. "International technology-oriented agreements to address climate change," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 335-356, January.
    2. David Perez Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2014. "Discrimination in a new model of contests with two-sided asymmetric information," Working Papers 1407, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    3. Murray, Fiona & Stern, Scott & Campbell, Georgina & MacCormack, Alan, 2012. "Grand Innovation Prizes: A theoretical, normative, and empirical evaluation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(10), pages 1779-1792.
    4. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2012. "Innovation Contests," Working Papers 654, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    5. Lehmann, Paul, 2009. "Climate Policies with Pollution Externalities and Learning Spillovers," MPRA Paper 21353, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Aalbers, Rob & Shestalova, Victoria & Kocsis, Viktória, 2013. "Innovation policy for directing technical change in the power sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 1240-1250.
    7. Masters, William A. & Delbecq, Benoit, 2008. "Accelerating innovation with prize rewards: History and typology of technology prizes and a new contest design for innovation in African agriculture," IFPRI discussion papers 835, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    8. Palmer, Karen & Burtraw, Dallas, 2005. "Cost-effectiveness of renewable electricity policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 873-894, November.
    9. Brennan, Timothy J. & Macauley, Molly & Whitefoot, Kate, 2011. "Prizes, Patents, and Technology Procurement: A Proposed Analytical Framework," Discussion Papers dp-11-21-rev, Resources For the Future.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    inducement prize; research and development; climate change; technology; policy;

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models

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