Contest Design And Optimal Endogenous Entry
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Giebe, Thomas, 2014.
"Innovation contests with entry auction,"
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- Giebe, Thomas, 2010. "Innovation Contests with Entry Auction," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 307, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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- Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra, 2012. "Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests – A Revenue Dominance Theorem," Ruhr Economic Papers 315, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra, 2013. "Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79998, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Thomas, Jonathan P. & Wang, Zhewei, 2013. "Optimal punishment in contests with endogenous entry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 34-50.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:212-229 is not listed on IDEAS
- Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng & Lu, Yuanzhu, 2012. "Incentivizing R&D: Prize or subsidies?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 67-79.
- Dmitry Ryvkin & Mikhail Drugov, 2017. "Tournaments," Working Papers wp2017_03_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Gu, Yiquan & Hehenkamp, Burkhard & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2017. "The Dark Side of the Force: Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Entry," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168168, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017. "Winner-Take-All Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 12067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossmann, Martin & Dietl, Helmut, 2015. "Heterogeneous outside options in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 280-287.
- Boosey, Luke & Brookins, Philip & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017.
"Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence,"
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- Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2016. "Contests with group size uncertainty: Experimental evidence," Working Papers wp2016_07_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
More about this item
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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