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Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights

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  • Shavell, Steven
  • van Ypersele, Tanguy

Abstract

This paper compares reward systems to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by the government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender incentives to innovate without creating the monopoly power of intellectual property rights. But a principal difficulty with rewards is the information required for their determination. We conclude in our model that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward systems and that an optional reward system--under which innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights--is superior to intellectual property rights. Copyright 2001 by the University of Chicago.

Suggested Citation

  • Shavell, Steven & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2001. "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 525-547, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:44:y:2001:i:2:p:525-47
    DOI: 10.1086/322811
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law

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