Forward Markets to Spur Innovation
This paper presents a mechanism inducing costly research and innovation in the absence of intellectual property rights. The mechanism relies on forward contracting between the provider of the innovation and firms or individuals that benefit from the pecuniary effects of the innovation, rather than from its direct use. Applied to innovation as a non-discrete public good, the mechanism resolves time consistency, agency, and free-riding problems, and provides an incentive for ex post efficient pricing.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2014|
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