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Political Disagreement, Lack of Commitment and the Level of Debt

  • Ricardo Nunes

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

  • Davide Debortoli

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

debt is sensibly increasing in the degree of political disagreement. Lower degree of commitment drives debt toward zero, while the frequency of political turnover does not produce relevant effects.

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Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2007 Meeting Papers with number 725.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed007:725
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