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Markov-Perfect Optimal Taxation

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  • Salvador Ortigueira

    (European University Institute)

Abstract

In this paper we study optimal taxation in a dynamic game played by a sequence of governments and a private sector composed of a continuum of households. We focus on the Markov-perfect equilibrium of this game under two different assumptions on the extent of government's intra-period commitment, which in turn define two notions of time consistency of the Markov policy. Our results show that the extent of government's intra-period commitment has important quantitative implications for policies, welfare, and macroeconomic variables, and consequently that it must be explicitly stated as one of the givens of the economy, alongside preferences, markets and technology. We see this as an important result, since most of the previous literature on Markovian optimal taxation has assumed, either interchangeably or unnoticeably, different degrees of government's intra-period commitment. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Ortigueira, 2006. "Markov-Perfect Optimal Taxation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(1), pages 153-178, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:9:y:2006:i:1:p:153-178 DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2005.10.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Novales, Alfonso & Pérez, Rafaela & Ruiz, Jesus, 2014. "Optimal time-consistent fiscal policy under endogenous growth with elastic labor supply," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 398-412.
    2. Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "Fiscal policy in a Real-Business-Cycle model with labor-intensive government services and endogenous public sector wages and hours," EconStor Preprints 142338, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    3. Sarolta Laczo & Raffaele Rossi, 2014. "Time-consistent consumption taxation," Working Papers 67495267, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    4. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2011. "Time-consistent Fiscal Policy under Heterogeneity: Conflicting or Common Interests?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3444, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Martin, Fernando M., 2015. "Policy And Welfare Effects Of Within-Period Commitment," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, pages 1401-1426.
    6. Ricardo Nunes & Davide Debortoli, 2007. "Political Disagreement, Lack of Commitment and the Level of Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers 725, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Eric M Leeper & Campbell Leith & Ding Liu, 2016. "Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary, Fiscal and Debt Maturity Policy," Working Papers 2016_04, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    8. Martin, Fernando M., 2015. "Debt, inflation and central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 129-150.
    9. Niemann, Stefan & Pichler, Paul & Sorger, Gerhard, 2013. "Public debt, discretionary policy, and inflation persistence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1097-1109.
    10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:50:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Occhino Filippo, 2012. "Government Debt Dynamics Under Discretion," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, pages 1-28.
    12. Chia-Lin Chang & David E. Allen & Michael McAleer & Teodosio Perez Amaral, 2013. "Risk Modeling and Management: An Overview," Working Papers in Economics 13/22, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    13. Fernando M. Martin, 2013. "Government Policy In Monetary Economies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(1), pages 185-217, February.
    14. Nakata, Taisuke, 2016. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 220-240.
    15. repec:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:3:p:399-410 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Laczo, Sarolta & Rossi, Raffaele, 2015. "Time-consistent consumption taxation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86317, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Zheng Song, 2011. "The Dynamics of Inequality and Social Security in General Equilibrium," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(4), pages 613-635, October.
    18. Salvador Ortigueira & Joana Pereira, 2007. "Markov-Perfect Optimal Fiscal Policy: The Case of Unbalanced Budgets," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/41, European University Institute.
    19. Marina Azzimonti, 2016. "The Politics of FDI Expropriation," NBER Working Papers 22705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Novales, Alfonso & Pérez, Rafaela & Ruiz, Jesús, 2014. "Optimal time-consistent fiscal policy in an endogenous growth economy with public consumption and capital," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, pages 104-117.
    21. Martin, Fernando M., 2010. "Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 503-521, March.
    22. Pichler, Paul, 2011. "Solving the multi-country Real Business Cycle model using a monomial rule Galerkin method," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 240-251, February.
    23. Ambler, Steve & Pelgrin, Florian, 2010. "Time-consistent control in nonlinear models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2215-2228, October.
    24. Niemann, S & Pichler, P & Sorger, G, 2008. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy Without Commitment," Economics Discussion Papers 2897, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    25. Ortigueira, Salvador, 2014. "On the Optimality of U.S. Fiscal Policy: 1960-2010," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1418, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Markov-perfect optimal taxation; Time-consistent policies; Instantaneous and non-instantaneous commitment; Numerical methods;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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