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Motivating Crowdworkers with Nonmonetary Incentives and Payment Framing—Evidence from a Large-Scale Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Maja Adena

    (WZB Berlin, TU Berlin)

  • Patrycja Janowska-Widomska

    (University of Warsaw)

  • Julian Harke

    (WZB Berlin)

Abstract

An increasing number of individuals worldwide are participating in crowdwork and tele-work. They often perform tasks such as AI training and content moderation. While these tasks are typically conducted in large quantities and often involve routine elements, their nature makes them inherently demanding. They require high levels of engagement or creativity and produce outputs of subjective quality that are difficult to measure. In a preregistered field experiment involving over 5,500 crowdworkers, we examined the impact of automated recognition and work-appreciation phrases and payment framing on motivation, performance, and job satisfaction. The results indicate that recognition—automated phrases: Great work! You did a good job! Nice job! Well done!—positively influences subjective job satisfaction, and that loss-framed payment is somewhat more effective than gain framing. Overall, the treatments have little effect on objective and subjective performance and moti-vation.

Suggested Citation

  • Maja Adena & Patrycja Janowska-Widomska & Julian Harke, 2026. "Motivating Crowdworkers with Nonmonetary Incentives and Payment Framing—Evidence from a Large-Scale Experiment," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 576, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:576
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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