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Optimal Contracts for Loss Averse Consumers

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Abstract

We report initial findings from a household survey of Pacific island migrants and their remittances, conducted in 2010-11 in New South Wales (NSW). The study covers three Polynesian communities, Samoans and Tongans as in previous studies, but also Cook Islanders. We cover migrants in both Sydney and regional NSW. We quantify remittances of all types, formally and informally transferred, and distinguish those sent to households and organizations (mainly churches) or invested, beyond the migrants’ home country household, which account for almost 40% of total remittances. We provide the first estimates of remittances to Cook Islands since the mid-eighties, and the first estimates of remittances from regional areas in Australia. We investigate a number of potential socio-economic determinants of remittance behavior including the migrants’ income, duration of absence, strength of ties to home country, and major events in home country and Australia. We identify a number of important differences among the three groups, and between the Riverina- and Sydney-based communities. Areas for further research from this dataset are identified.

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  • Juan Carlos Carbajal & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2012. "Optimal Contracts for Loss Averse Consumers," Discussion Papers Series 460, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
  • Handle: RePEc:qld:uq2004:460
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    File URL: https://economics.uq.edu.au/files/45688/460.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Rosato, 2016. "Selling substitute goods to loss-averse consumers: limited availability, bargains, and rip-offs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(3), pages 709-733, August.
    2. Daniele Pennesi, 2013. "Endogenous Status Quo," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 314, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    3. Nana Adrian, 2019. "Price Discrimination and Salient Thinking," Diskussionsschriften dp1906, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    4. Courty, Pascal & Nasiry, Javad, 2015. "Loss Aversion and the Uniform Pricing Puzzle for Vertically Differentiated Products," CEPR Discussion Papers 10523, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. David Freeman, 2013. "Revealed Preference Foundations of Expectations-Based Reference-Dependence," Discussion Papers dp13-10, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    6. Daido, Kohei & Morita, Kimiyuki & Murooka, Takeshi & Ogawa, Hiromasa, 2013. "Task assignment under agent loss aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 35-38.
    7. Pascal Courty & Javad Nasiry, 2018. "Loss aversion and the uniform pricing puzzle for media and entertainment products," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(1), pages 105-140, July.
    8. Chi Zhou & Jin Peng & Zhibing Liu & Binwei Dong, 2019. "Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion," Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 85-102, March.
    9. Edoardo Grillo, 2013. "Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 331, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    10. Dillenberger, David & Raymond, Collin, 2019. "On the consensus effect," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 384-416.

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