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Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment

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  • Kim, Jin-Hyuk

Abstract

This paper studies the determinants of lobbying-employment decisions of former members of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 105th–108thCongresses. The main empirical findings indicate that there are two groups more likely to become lobbyists: members not re-elected who had more conservative voting records and held important committee assignments and longer-serving members who voluntarily retired and voted less conservatively in their last term compared to their previous terms in office. A decomposition analysis confirms that the revolving doors for the two groups of legislators differ because of differences in employer response rather than in legislator characteristics.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Jin-Hyuk, 2012. "Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment," MPRA Paper 82375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:82375
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Revolving doors; Lobbying; Post-employment restrictions; U.S. Congress;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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