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Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists: the irrelevance of privatization

  • Claude, Denis
  • Tidball, Mabel

This paper examines the optimal environmental policy in a mixed oligopoly when pollution accumulates over time. Specifically, we assume quantity competition between several private firms and one partially privatized firm. The optimal emission tax is shown to be independent of the weight the privatized firm puts on social welfare. The optimal tax rule, the accumulated stock of pollution, firms' production paths and profit streams are identical irrespective of the public firm's ownership status.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/776/1/MPRA_paper_776.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 776.

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Date of creation: 10 Jul 2006
Date of revision: 15 Oct 2006
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:776
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  1. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
  2. Requate, Till, 2005. "Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition : A Survey," Economics Working Papers 2005,12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  3. Sun, Qunyan & Zhang, Anming & Li, Jie, 2005. "A study of optimal state shares in mixed oligopoly: Implications for SOE reform and foreign competition," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-27.
  4. J Hindriks & D Claude, 2006. "Strategic Privatization and Regulation Policy in Mixed Markets," The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, IUP Publications, vol. 0(1), pages 7-26, February.
  5. Karp, Larry & Livernois, John, 1992. "On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable resource monopolist," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 219-239, November.
  6. Xiangkang Yin, 2003. "Corrective Taxes under Oligopoly with Inter-Firm Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(2), pages 269-277, October.
  7. Barnett, A H, 1980. "The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 1037-41, December.
  8. Sang-Ho Lee & Hae-Shin Hwang, 2003. "Partial Ownership For The Public Firm And Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 324-335.
  9. Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2001. "Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms' moves: an irrelevance result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-5.
  10. Karp Larry & Livernois John, 1994. "Using Automatic Tax Changes to Control Pollution Emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 38-48, July.
  11. White, Mark D., 1996. "Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 189-195, November.
  12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2002:i:1:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
  14. Toshihiro Matsumura & Osamu Kanda, 2005. "Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 27-48, 02.
  15. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
  16. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
  17. Katsoulacos, Yannis & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 1994. "Environmental Policy Under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 955, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Buchanan, James M, 1969. "External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 174-77, March.
  19. Misiolek, Walter S., 1980. "Effluent taxation in monopoly markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 103-107, June.
  20. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
  21. Bergstrom, Theodore C. & Cross, John G. & Porter, Richard C., 1981. "Efficiency-inducing taxation for a monopolistically supplied depletable resource," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 23-32, February.
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