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Privatization, Government's Preference and Unionization Structure: A Mixed Oligopoly Approach

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  • Kangsik, Choi

Abstract

By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into the theoretical framework of unionized mixed oligopolies, this study investigates the efficiency of privatization. The results show that (i) regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues, its incentive to privatize a public firm depends on the number of the private firms and (ii) social welfare can decrease with an increase in the number of firms depending on the level of government's preference for tax revenue. Moreover, if the number of private firms and the government's preference for tax revenue are sufficiently small, then social welfare under a unionized privatized oligopoly is greater than under a unionized mixed oligopoly while the government has an incentive not to privatize the public firm, and vice versa if only the number of firms is sufficiently large.

Suggested Citation

  • Kangsik, Choi, 2009. "Privatization, Government's Preference and Unionization Structure: A Mixed Oligopoly Approach," MPRA Paper 13028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government's Preference; Social Welfare; Tax; Privatization; Union;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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