IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Endogenous Timing with Government's Preference and Privatization

  • Kangsik, Choi

By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into an extended game with observable delay, this study provides new insight into the trade-off between the government and the public firm's payoff in a government's optimal policy of privatization. The results show that: (i) regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues, the government does not have an incentive to privatize in an endogenous timing context even though there are conflicts of interest between the public firm and the government and (ii) under a mixed duopoly, each sequential-move equilibrium varies with the level of the government's preference for tax revenues.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13844/1/MPRA_paper_13844.pdf
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13844.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 07 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13844
Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Mario Jametti & Marius Brülhart, 2007. "Does Tax Competition Tame the Leviathan?," Working Papers 2007_7, York University, Department of Economics.
  2. Mujumdar, Sudesh & Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 199-204, February.
  3. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
  4. Zax, Jeffrey S, 1989. "Is There a Leviathan in Your Neighborhood?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 560-67, June.
  5. Forbes, Kevin F & Zampelli, Ernest M, 1989. "Is Leviathan a Mythical Beast?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 568-77, June.
  6. Fjell, Kenneth & Heywood, John S., 2004. "Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firm's moves: the relevance of privatization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 411-416, June.
  7. Juan Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Price Competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 263-272, July.
  8. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
  9. Rudra Sensarma & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(28), pages 1-10.
  10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:28:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Michael Rauscher, 2000. "Interjurisdictional Competition and Public-Sector Prodigality: The Triumph of the Market over the State?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(1), pages 89-, September.
  12. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 275-287, 07.
  13. Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2001. "Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms' moves: an irrelevance result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-5.
  14. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521233293 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Jacques, Armel, 2004. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly: a forgotten equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 147-148, May.
  16. Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November.
  17. White, Mark D., 1996. "Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 189-195, November.
  18. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2002:i:1:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1991. "Efficiency and Privatisation in Imperfectly Competitive Industries," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3), pages 311-21, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13844. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.