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The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Rudra Sensarma

    (University of Hertfordshire)

  • Bibhas Saha

    (University of East Anglia)

Abstract

We study a mixed oligopoly where a partially public firm competeswith a private firm. When the private firm offers managerialincentives, there is a redistribution of profit and output fromthe private to the public firm, but the aggregate output andsocial welfare may remain unchanged. When the private firm isforeign owned, the extent of privatization is less whilemanagerial incentives are milder.

Suggested Citation

  • Rudra Sensarma & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(28), pages 1-10.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08l10033
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John S. Heywood & Guangliang Ye, 2009. "Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(2), pages 71-82.
    2. Winston Chang, 2007. "Optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 31-52.
    3. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
    4. Yasuhiko Nakamura & Tomohiro Inoue, 2007. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: The Managerial Delegation Case," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(27), pages 1-7.
    5. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2007:i:27:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-311, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kangsik, Choi, 2009. "Privatization, Government's Preference and Unionization Structure: A Mixed Oligopoly Approach," MPRA Paper 13028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Johan Willner, 2010. "Public Options and Altruistic Firms - Antitrust Targets or Tools? The Welfare Impact of a Mixed Oligopoly With Managerial firms," Discussion Papers 59, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    3. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024. "Pollution, partial privatization and the effect of ambient charges: price competition," MPRA Paper 120531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Inventory Holding and a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Joint-Stock Firm," MPRA Paper 88223, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Kangsik Choi & Yuanzhu Lu, 2009. "A Model Of Endogenous Payoff Motives And Endogenous Timing In A Mixed Duopoly," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 203-223, September.
    6. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2019. "Capacity choice in an international mixed triopoly," Working Papers e140, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    7. Kangsik Choi, 2009. "Privatization and Government's Preference under Mixed Oligopoly: A Generalization," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(2), pages 861-866.
    8. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2020. "Price-setting mixed duopoly, partial privatisation and subsidisation," MPRA Paper 104063, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Choi, Kangsik, 2009. "Government's Preference and Timing of Endogenous Wage Setting: Perspectives on Privatization and Mixed Duopoly," MPRA Paper 17221, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Choi, Kangsik, 2013. "Unionized Mixed Oligopoly and Privatization with Excess Burden of Taxation," MPRA Paper 51156, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2019. "Capacity choice in an international mixed triopoly," MPRA Paper 94051, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Kangsik, Choi, 2009. "Endogenous Timing with Government's Preference and Privatization," MPRA Paper 13844, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2021. "Pollution, partial privatization and the effect of ambient charges," MPRA Paper 106319, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Johan Willner, 2013. "The welfare impact of a managerial oligopoly with an altruistic firm," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(2), pages 97-115, June.
    15. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2022. "Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 21(1), pages 27-42, June.
    16. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2021. "Pollution, partial privatization and the effect of ambient charges," MPRA Paper 109592, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Sep 2021.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mixed duopoly;

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise

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