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Lies, Discrimination, and Internalized Racism: Findings from the lab

Author

Listed:
  • David, Wozniak
  • Tim, MacNeill

Abstract

We simulate a job application/hiring market in the lab to examine racial discrimination. We find little evidence of ability differences based on race but we find taste-based racism between groups and statistical racism within groups. When candidates are given the opportunity to lie about their abilities, all groups discriminate against Blacks, suggesting statistical discrimination. But Whites continue to discriminate against Blacks when actual abilities of the candidate are known, suggesting taste-based discrimination. In contrast to the bulk of studies that attempt to establish racism in general as either a taste-based or statistical, our design allows us to show that the type of discrimination can depend on the personal characteristics of the discriminating individual along with the contextual information available.

Suggested Citation

  • David, Wozniak & Tim, MacNeill, 2015. "Lies, Discrimination, and Internalized Racism: Findings from the lab," MPRA Paper 67541, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:67541
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67541/1/MPRA_paper_67541.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2010. "Equilibrium Fictions: A Cognitive Approach to Societal Rigidity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 141-146, May.
    2. Card, David & Rothstein, Jesse, 2007. "Racial segregation and the black-white test score gap," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2158-2184, December.
    3. Bergmann, Barbara R, 1971. "The Effect on White Incomes of Discrimination in Employment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(2), pages 294-313, March-Apr.
    4. Nick Feltovich & Richmond Harbaugh & Ted To, 2002. "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 630-649, Winter.
    5. Uri Gneezy & John List & Michael K. Price, 2012. "Toward an Understanding of Why People Discriminate: Evidence from a Series of Natural Field Experiments," NBER Working Papers 17855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Catherine C. Eckel & Ragan Petrie, 2011. "Face Value," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1497-1513, June.
    7. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
    8. Castillo, Marco & Petrie, Ragan, 2010. "Discrimination in the lab: Does information trump appearance?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 50-59, January.
    9. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 991-1013, September.
    10. Peter A. Riach & Judith Rich, 2004. "Deceptive Field Experiments of Discrimination: Are they Ethical?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 457-470, August.
    11. Rich, Judy, 2014. "What Do Field Experiments of Discrimination in Markets Tell Us? A Meta Analysis of Studies Conducted since 2000," IZA Discussion Papers 8584, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Discrimination; Experiment; Racism; Signalling; Screening;

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

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