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Democratization and civil war

  • Armey, Laura E.
  • McNab, Robert M.

We examine the impact of civil war on democratization. Using a theoretical bargaining model, we hypothesize that prolonged violence, war termination, the presence of natural resources, and international intervention influence democratization. We test these hypotheses using an unbalanced panel data set of 96 countries covering a 34-year period. We determine that civil war lowers democratization in the succeeding period. This finding appears to be robust to conditioning, different instrument sets, and the measurement of democracy. In addition, we observe evidence that external intervention increases democratization.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42460/1/MPRA_paper_42460.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 42460.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:42460
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  1. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2005. "Income and Democracy," NBER Working Papers 11205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  10. Mehmet Gurses & T. David Mason, 2008. "Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-Civil-War Democracy," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 89(2), pages 315-336.
  11. Michael McBride & Gary Milante & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009. "Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity," Working Papers 091002, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  12. Bruce Cronin, 2010. "Be careful what you wish for: War aims and the construction of postwar political orders," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(6), pages 791-801, November.
  13. Silje Aslaksen, 2010. "Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(4), pages 421-431, July.
  14. Dawn Brancati & Jack L. Snyder, 2011. "Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Postconflict Elections," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(3), pages 469-492, June.
  15. B. Peter Rosendorff, 2001. "Choosing Democracy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 1-29, 03.
  16. Heid, Benedikt & Langer, Julian & Larch, Mario, 2012. "Income and democracy: Evidence from system GMM estimates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 166-169.
  17. Perotti, Roberto, 1996. " Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 149-87, June.
  18. Collier, Paul, 2008. "The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195374636, March.
  19. Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April.
  20. Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Warner, Andrew M., 2001. "The curse of natural resources," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 827-838, May.
  21. Csordás, Stefan & Ludwig, Markus, 2011. "An empirical investigation of the determinants of democracy: Trade, aid and the neighbor effect," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 235-237, March.
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