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Does Increased Civil Service Pay Deter Corruption? Evidence from China

Author

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  • Gong, Ting
  • Wu, Alfred M.

Abstract

The temporal persistence and geographical prevalence of corruption in the world have provoked a vast amount of research into its causes. Low civil service remuneration, especially in less developed nations, is believed to be an important contributing factor to corruption. The assumption is that when salaries are low but expectations for service remains high, government officials may demand more compensation from informal or even illegal channels than what is officially sanctioned; hence, corruption arises. Accordingly, increased pay level is assumed to be effective in deterring corruption.Using China as a case, we argue that the relationship between civil service pay and corruption is not as simple as suggested. The empirical evidence gathered from China casts doubt on the assumed connection between the two to debunk the myth that increasing civil service pay contributes to the control of corruption. The article also presents the policy implications of the above analysis for human resource management and civil service governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Gong, Ting & Wu, Alfred M., 2012. "Does Increased Civil Service Pay Deter Corruption? Evidence from China," MPRA Paper 41815, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:41815
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dang, Jingqi & Liu, Cong & Yan, Ru, 2025. "Signals of clean governance: Evidence from luxury wine imports in China," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 255(C).
    2. Peiyi Lu & Ying Liang, 2016. "Health-Related Quality of Life of Young Chinese Civil Servants Working in Local Government: Comparison of SF-12 and EQ5D," Applied Research in Quality of Life, Springer;International Society for Quality-of-Life Studies, vol. 11(4), pages 1445-1464, December.
    3. Colin Knox & Dina Sharipova, 2023. "Public sector reforms in developing countries: A preliminary review," Public Administration & Development, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(5), pages 368-380, December.
    4. Qinxuan Gu & Thomas Tang & Wan Jiang, 2015. "Does Moral Leadership Enhance Employee Creativity? Employee Identification with Leader and Leader–Member Exchange (LMX) in the Chinese Context," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 126(3), pages 513-529, February.
    5. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    6. Xiaodi Zhang, 2024. "Public sector employment rigidity and macroeconomic fluctuation: A DSGE simulation for China," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 19(9), pages 1-26, September.
    7. Yemane Desta, 2019. "Manifestations and Causes of Civil Service Corruption in Developing Countries," Journal of Public Administration and Governance, Macrothink Institute, vol. 9(3), pages 23-35, December.
    8. Anil Hira, 2016. "Broken Windows: Why Culture Matters in Corruption Reform," Journal of Developing Societies, , vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, March.
    9. Eugen Dimant & Guglielmo Tosato, 2018. "Causes And Effects Of Corruption: What Has Past Decade'S Empirical Research Taught Us? A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 335-356, April.
    10. Chuah,Lay Lian & Loayza,Norman V. & Myers,C. Bernard, 2020. "The Fight against Corruption : Taming Tigers and Swatting Flies," Research and Policy Briefs 145050, The World Bank.
    11. An, Weihua & Kweon, Yesola, 2017. "Do higher government wages induce less corruption? Cross-country panel evidence," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 809-826.
    12. Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah, 2017. "‘Strong Personalities’ and ‘Strong Institutions’ Mediated by a ‘Strong Third Force’: Thinking ‘Systems’ in Corruption Control," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 545-562, December.

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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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