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The effect of vertical knowledge spillovers via the supply chain on location decision of firms


  • Kashefi, Mohammad Ali


In this paper a game theoretic model is employed to analyze the relationship between strategic location decision of firms in the supply chain considering the role of horizontal and vertical knowledge spillovers, and numerical approach is applied to characterize the equilibria of the considered multi-stage game. Geographical concentration or isolation as equilibrium outcome is determined based on our different parameterizations and two scenarios each consists of two separated cases, which we establish according to the location of our agents. In the first scenario both suppliers are supposed to be located in different regions while in the second one they act in a same region. In addition, first case of each scenario considers geographical isolation of two producers whereas second case investigates the geographical concentration. Furthermore, the effect of different technological level of our agents on their final location decision is investigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Kashefi, Mohammad Ali, 2011. "The effect of vertical knowledge spillovers via the supply chain on location decision of firms," MPRA Paper 31743, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 May 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:31743

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
    2. Beugelsdijk, Sjoerd & Smeets, Roger & Zwinkels, Remco, 2008. "The impact of horizontal and vertical FDI on host's country economic growth," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 452-472, August.
    3. Andres Almazan & Adolfo De Motta & Sheridan Titman, 2007. "Firm Location and the Creation and Utilization of Human Capital," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 1305-1327.
    4. Hans Gersbach & Armin Schmutzler, 2003. "Endogenous spillovers and incentives to innovate," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(1), pages 59-79, January.
    5. Paul Krugman & Anthony J. Venables, 1995. "Globalization and the Inequality of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 857-880.
    6. Baldwin, Richard E. & Martin, Philippe, 2004. "Agglomeration and regional growth," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,in: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 60, pages 2671-2711 Elsevier.
    7. Dawid, Herbert & Greiner, Alfred & Zou, Benteng, 2010. "Optimal foreign investment dynamics in the presence of technological spillovers," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 296-313, March.
    8. Matouschek, Niko & Robert-Nicoud, Frederic, 2005. "The role of human capital investments in the location decision of firms," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 570-583, September.
    9. Juan Alcácer & Wilbur Chung, 2007. "Location Strategies and Knowledge Spillovers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(5), pages 760-776, May.
    10. Audretsch, David B. & Feldman, Maryann P., 2004. "Knowledge spillovers and the geography of innovation," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,in: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 61, pages 2713-2739 Elsevier.
    11. John Cantwell, 2009. "Location and the multinational enterprise," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 40(1), pages 35-41, January.
    12. Ishii, Akira, 2004. "Cooperative R&D between vertically related firms with spillovers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1213-1235, November.
    13. repec:hhs:iuiwop:430 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 1999. "A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 15(3), pages 253-262, November.
    15. René Belderbos & Elissavet Lykogianni & Reinhilde Veugelers, 2008. "Strategic R&D Location by Multinational Firms: Spillovers, Technology Sourcing, and Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 759-779, September.
    16. Riggs, William & von Hippel, Eric, 1994. "Incentives to innovate and the sources of innovation: the case of scientific instruments," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 459-469, July.
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    More about this item


    Strategic Firm Location; Knowledge Spillover; Geographical Concentration; Supply Chain;

    JEL classification:

    • R30 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • C88 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Other Computer Software
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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