Fair value accounting and procyclicality: mitigating regulatory and accounting policy differences through regulatory structure reforms and Enforced Self Regulation
In what ways can changes to the structure of regulation (as well as other regulatory reforms) mitigate the effects of policies which trigger financial instability? More specifically policies, information asymmetries or externalities which could give rise to bank contagion, systemic/liquidity risks or procyclical effects? Whilst acknowledging that accounting standards play a fundamental role in addressing problems which could contribute to information asymmetries and ultimately systemic risks, this paper also highlights why the type of regulatory structure, clear allocation of responsibilities between regulators, as well as measures aimed at fostering accountability, constitute vital elements which could serve as safeguards in mitigating procyclical effects (as well as other factors) which could trigger financial instability. In achieving this aim, the paper focusses on the rationale for fair value accounting, as well as problematic issues arising from its implementation. The adoption of international accounting standards is considered to have a vital role in contributing to financial stability. This paper will also illustrate how the implementation of accounting standards and policies, in certain instances, have contrasted with Basel Committee initiatives aimed at mitigating procyclicality and facilitating forward looking provisioning. More importantly, the paper will highlight how and why differences between regulatory and accounting policies could (and should) be mitigated.
|Date of creation:||05 Mar 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Prat, Andrea, 2003.
"The Wrong Kind of Transparency,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3859, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andrea Prat, 2002. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 439, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Andrea Prat, 2004. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24712, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Andrea Prat, 2002. "The wrong kind of transparency," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3679, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Laeven, Luc & Majnoni, Giovanni, 2003.
"Loan loss provisioning and economic slowdowns: too much, too late?,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 178-197, April.
- Luc Laeven & Giovanni Majnoni, 2002. "Loan loss provisioning and economic slowdowns: too much too late?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Laeven, Luc & Majnoni, Giovanni, 2001. "Loan loss provisioning and economic slowdowns : too much, too late?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2749, The World Bank.
- Rolf H. Weber, 2010. "Multilayered Governance in International Financial Regulation and Supervision," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 683-704, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29314. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.