International coordination over emissions and R&D expenditures: What does oil scarcity change?
In this paper, we studied the problem of international coordination in climate policy using three state-variables (oil marginal extraction cost, pollution and knowledge), two asymmetric countries and a differential game. We used a Monte Carlo procedure to obtain an insight into the behaviour of the model. We discutes the importance of R&D in international agreements and the impact of economic growth in developing countries.
|Date of creation:||2007|
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Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Rolf Golombek & Michael Hoel, 2005.
"Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 201-227, 06.
- Golombek, Rolf & Hoel, Michael, 2003. "Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers," Memorandum 22/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Rolf Golombek & Michael Hoel, 2003. "Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers," Working Papers 2003.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Romer, Paul M, 1990. "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 71-102, October.
- Paul Romer, 1989. "Endogenous Technological Change," NBER Working Papers 3210, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul M Romer, 1999. "Endogenous Technological Change," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2135, David K. Levine.
- List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, July.
- Forster, Bruce A., 1975. "Optimal pollution control with a nonconstant exponential rate of decay," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 1-6, September.
- Golombek Rolf & Hoel Michael, 2006. "Second-Best Climate Agreements and Technology Policy," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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