International coordination over emissions and R&D expenditures: What does oil scarcity change?
In this paper, we studied the problem of international coordination in climate policy using three state-variables (oil marginal extraction cost, pollution and knowledge), two asymmetric countries and a differential game. We used a Monte Carlo procedure to obtain an insight into the behaviour of the model. We discutes the importance of R&D in international agreements and the impact of economic growth in developing countries.
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