IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/20731.html

Distribution of responsibility, ability and competition

Author

Listed:
  • Graafland, J.J.

Abstract

This paper considers the distribution of responsibility for prevention of negative social or ecological effects of production and consumption. Responsibility is related to ability and ability depends on welfare. An increase in competition between Western companies depresses their profitability, but increases the welfare of Western consumers, and hence their ability, to acknowledge social values. Therefore, an increase in competition on consumer markets shifts the balance in responsibility from companies to consumers to prevent negative external effects from production and consumption patterns. An increase in competition on investor markets will shift the balance in an opposite direction.

Suggested Citation

  • Graafland, J.J., 2003. "Distribution of responsibility, ability and competition," MPRA Paper 20731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20731
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20731/1/MPRA_paper_20731.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Physician agency," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 461-536, Elsevier.
    2. Graafland, J.J., 2002. "Sourcing ethics in the textile sector: The case of C&A," MPRA Paper 20769, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Graafland, J.J., 2001. "Profts and principles: Four perspectives," MPRA Paper 21134, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Graafland, J.J., 2002. "Modelling the trade-off between profits and principles," MPRA Paper 20752, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. J.J. Graafland & H. Smid, 2004. "Reputation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Market Regulation," Review of Business and Economic Literature, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Review of Business and Economic Literature, vol. 0(2), pages 271-308.
    2. Cristina Longo & Avi Shankar & Peter Nuttall, 2019. "“It’s Not Easy Living a Sustainable Lifestyle”: How Greater Knowledge Leads to Dilemmas, Tensions and Paralysis," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 759-779, February.
    3. Sarit Nisim & Orly Benjamin, 2008. "Power and Size of Firms as Reflected in Cleaning Subcontractors’ Practices of Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 83(4), pages 673-683, December.
    4. J. Graafland, 2010. "Do Markets Crowd Out Virtues? An Aristotelian Framework," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 91(1), pages 1-19, January.
    5. Oana Branzei & Jeff Frooman & Brent Mcknight & Charlene Zietsma, 2018. "What Good Does Doing Good do? The Effect of Bond Rating Analysts’ Corporate Bias on Investor Reactions to Changes in Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 183-203, March.
    6. Faruk Bhuiyan & Kevin Baird & Rahat Munir, 2022. "The associations between management control systems, market orientation and CSR use," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 27-79, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. J.J. Graafland & H. Smid, 2004. "Reputation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Market Regulation," Review of Business and Economic Literature, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Review of Business and Economic Literature, vol. 0(2), pages 271-308.
    2. J.J. Graafland & S.C.W. Eijffinger, 2004. "Corporate social responsibility of Dutch companies: Benchmarking, transparency and robustness," De Economist, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 403-426, September.
    3. Currie, Janet & Lin, Wanchuan & Zhang, Wei, 2011. "Patient knowledge and antibiotic abuse: Evidence from an audit study in China," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 933-949.
    4. James M. Malcomson, 2005. "Supplier Discretion Over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 412-429, Summer.
    5. Tor Iversen & Ching-to Ma, 2011. "Market conditions and general practitioners’ referrals," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 245-265, December.
    6. Marie Allard & Izabela Jelovac & Pierre-Thomas Léger, 2010. "Physicians self selection of a payment mechanism: Capitation versus fee-for-service," Post-Print halshs-00523370, HAL.
    7. Fang, Hai & Rizzo, John A., 2009. "Competition and physician-enabled demand: The role of managed care," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 463-474, October.
    8. D. Fabbri & C. Monfardini & R. Radice, 2004. "Testing exogeneity in the bivariate probit model: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to health economics," Working Papers 514, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    9. Mousquès, Julien & Renaud, Thomas & Scemama, Olivier, 2010. "Is the "practice style" hypothesis relevant for general practitioners? An analysis of antibiotics prescription for acute rhinopharyngitis," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 70(8), pages 1176-1184, April.
    10. Eric Delattre & Brigitte Dormont, 2003. "Fixed fees and physician‐induced demand: A panel data study on French physicians," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(9), pages 741-754, September.
    11. Breyer Friedrich, 2018. "Was spricht gegen Zwei-Klassen-Medizin?," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 67(1), pages 30-41, May.
    12. Liliana Chicaíza, 2005. "Fallas del mercado de la salud en Colombia: el caso de la insuficiencia renal crónica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 7(12), pages 191-208, January-J.
    13. Martin Gaynor & James Rebitzer & Lowell Taylor, "undated". "Incentives in HMOs," GSIA Working Papers 2003-E21, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    14. Niklas Egels-Zandén & Evelina Wahlqvist, 2007. "Post-Partnership Strategies for Defining Corporate Responsibility: The Business Social Compliance Initiative," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 175-189, January.
    15. Graafland, J.J., 2002. "Modelling the trade-off between profits and principles," MPRA Paper 20752, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Philippe Choné & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2004. "Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency : Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity," Working Papers 2004-37, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    17. María González-Rodríguez & María Díaz-Fernández & Marek Pawlak & Biagio Simonetti, 2013. "Perceptions of students university of corporate social responsibility," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 2361-2377, June.
    18. Ven van de, B. & Graafland, J.J., 2006. "Strategic and moral motivation for corporate social responsibility," MPRA Paper 20278, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Grant Miller & Kimberly Singer Babiarz, 2013. "Pay-for-Performance Incentives in Low- and Middle-Income Country Health Programs," NBER Working Papers 18932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Lien, Hsien-Ming & Albert Ma, Ching-To & McGuire, Thomas G., 2004. "Provider-client interactions and quantity of health care use," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 1261-1283, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • L19 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Other
    • D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20731. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.