IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/125748.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Reconsidering the Relationship between CBI and FIX

Author

Listed:
  • Bearce, David H.
  • Garriga, Ana Carolina

Abstract

This research note reconsiders the question of whether central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates (FIX) function as substitutes or complements. We argue that these monetary institutions have neither served as substitutes nor performed as complements for either inflation control or exchange rate stability. In terms of their substitutability, our statistical evidence shows that while CBI has been used for inflation control, FIX has been more directed towards exchange rate stability using updated datasets with these monetary institutions measured both on a de jure and de facto basis with nearly global country/year coverage from 1970 to 2020. In terms of their complementarity, our results also demonstrate that CBI was not more effective at reducing inflation when paired with greater FIX and FIX was not more effective at promoting exchange rate stability when paired with greater CBI. If anything, both are less effective when paired with the other monetary institution. These results suggest a “third generation” framework for studying CBI and FIX together with a focus on macroeconomic objectives beyond just domestic price stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Bearce, David H. & Garriga, Ana Carolina, 2025. "Reconsidering the Relationship between CBI and FIX," MPRA Paper 125748, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:125748
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/125748/1/MPRA_paper_125748.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Dedola, Luca & Leduc, Sylvain, 2008. "High exchange-rate volatility and low pass-through," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 1113-1128, September.
    2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 1-48.
    3. Clark, William Roberts & Hallerberg, Mark, 2000. "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 323-346, June.
    4. Ethan Ilzetzki & Carmen M Reinhart & Kenneth S Rogoff, 2019. "Exchange Arrangements Entering the Twenty-First Century: Which Anchor will Hold?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(2), pages 599-646.
    5. Menzie D. Chinn & Guy Meredith, 2004. "Monetary Policy and Long-Horizon Uncovered Interest Parity," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(3), pages 409-430, November.
    6. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    7. Frankel, Jeffrey, 2004. "On the Renminbi: The Choice between Adjustment under a Fixed Exchange Rate and Adustment under a Flexible Rate," Working Paper Series rwp04-037, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    8. Walter, Stefanie, 2008. "A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(3), pages 405-438, July.
    9. Jordi Galí & Tommaso Monacelli, 2005. "Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 707-734.
    10. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    11. Frieden, Jeffry A., 2002. "Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 831-860, October.
    12. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2023. "Central bank independence and inflation volatility in developing countries," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1320-1341.
    13. Broz, J. Lawrence, 2002. "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 861-887, October.
    14. Bodea, Cristina, 2010. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Independent Central Banks: A Correlated Choice of Imperfectly Credible Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 411-442, July.
    15. Frieden, Jeffry A., 1991. "Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 425-451, October.
    16. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2003. "The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(3), pages 407-423, August.
    17. Brambor, Thomas & Clark, William Roberts & Golder, Matt, 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 63-82, January.
    18. Cristina Bodea, 2014. "Fixed exchange rates, independent central banks and price stability in postcommunist countries: Conservatism and credibility," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 185-211, July.
    19. Rose, Andrew K., 1996. "Explaining exchange rate volatility: an empirical analysis of 'the holy trinity' of monetary independence, fixed exchange rates, and capital mobility," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 925-945, December.
    20. Simmons, Beth A., 1996. "Rulers of the game: central bank independence during the interwar years," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 407-443, July.
    21. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2008. "Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 778-787, December.
    22. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2020. "More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 87-105.
    23. Jay C. Shambaugh, 2004. "The Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates on Monetary Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 301-352.
    24. Berg, Andrew & Ostry, Jonathan D. & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2012. "What makes growth sustained?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 149-166.
    25. David A. Steinberg, 2016. "Developmental states and undervalued exchange rates in the developing world," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 418-449, May.
    26. Dani Rodrik, 2008. "The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(2 (Fall)), pages 365-439.
    27. Jonathan Kropko & Robert Kubinec, 2020. "Interpretation and identification of within-unit and cross-sectional variation in panel data models," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-22, April.
    28. Garriga, Ana Carolina, 2025. "Revisiting Central Bank Independence in the World: An Extended Dataset," MPRA Paper 123578, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    29. Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo & Sturzenegger, Federico & Gluzmann, Pablo Alfredo, 2013. "Fear of appreciation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 233-247.
    30. Bearce, David H. & Roosevelt, Megan, 2023. "The variation in firm lobbying by political regime: can it explain trade and currency policy differences?," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 95-109, January.
    31. Bernhard, William & Broz, J. Lawrence & Clark, William Roberts, 2002. "The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 693-723, October.
    32. Annika Alexius, 2001. "Uncovered Interest Parity Revisited," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 505-517, August.
    33. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2016. "Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 849-868, October.
    34. Bodea, Cristina & Hicks, Raymond, 2015. "Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 35-61, January.
    35. Leertouwer, Erik & Maier, Philipp, 2002. "International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD Economies: A Comment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(1), pages 209-221, January.
    36. Michaël Aklin & Eric Arias & Julia Gray, 2022. "Inflation concerns and mass preferences over exchange‐rate policy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 5-40, March.
    37. Frenkel, Roberto & Ros, Jaime, 2006. "Unemployment and the real exchange rate in Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 631-646, April.
    38. Guisinger, Alexandra & Singer, David Andrew, 2010. "Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 313-337, April.
    39. Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo & Sturzenegger, Federico, 2005. "Classifying exchange rate regimes: Deeds vs. words," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1603-1635, August.
    40. Clark, William Roberts, 2002. "Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 725-749, October.
    41. Bodea, Cristina, 2010. "The political economy of fixed exchange rate regimes: The experience of post-communist countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 248-264, June.
    42. Nickell, Stephen J, 1981. "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1417-1426, November.
    43. Adolph,Christopher, 2013. "Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107032613, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Plümper, Thomas & Neumayer, Eric, 2011. "Fear of floating and de facto exchange rate pegs with multiple key currencies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 40052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer, 2008. "Exchange Rate Regime Choice with Multiple Key Currencies," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp264, IIIS.
    3. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2020. "More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 87-105.
    4. Bodea, Cristina & Hicks, Raymond, 2015. "Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 35-61, January.
    5. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    6. Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2021. "The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    7. Ugurlu, Esra Nur & Razmi, Arslan, 2023. "Political economy of real exchange rate levels," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 918-940.
    8. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2023. "Central bank independence and inflation volatility in developing countries," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1320-1341.
    9. Bodea, Cristina & Higashijima, Masaaki, 2017. "Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 47-70, January.
    10. Joon Hyeok Lee, 2024. "Consecutive decentralization: The effect of central bank independence on capital account liberalization," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 809-831, July.
    11. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    12. Hyunwoo Kim, 2023. "Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability: how central bank independence conditions economic voting," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 939-964, May.
    13. Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    14. Jäger, Kai, 2016. "The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 79-96.
    15. Michael A. Gavin, 2020. "Independent central banks and banking crisis liquidity," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 109-131, January.
    16. Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Essiane, Patrick-Nelson Daniel, 2018. "Autonomie des Banques Centrales et Finances Publiques en Afrique subsaharienne [Autonomy of Central Banks and Public Finances in Sub-saharan Africa]," MPRA Paper 100828, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Jamus Jerome Lim, 2021. "The limits of central bank independence for inflation performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 309-335, March.
    18. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    19. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Geoffrey Minne, 2014. "Mark my Words: Information and the Fear of Declaring one’s Exchange Rate Regime," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 107, pages 244-261, March.
    20. Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Sowerbutts, Rhiannon & Whitworth, Andrew, 2025. "Does regulatory and supervisory independence affect financial stability?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:125748. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.