IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/123578.html

Revisiting Central Bank Independence in the World: An Extended Dataset

Author

Listed:
  • Garriga, Ana Carolina

Abstract

How has central bank independence (CBI) changed over time and across countries? This paper introduces the most comprehensive dataset on de jure CBI, including country-year observations covering 192 countries between 1970 and 2023. The dataset identifies statutory reforms affecting CBI, their direction, and codes four dimensions of CBI (personnel independence, central bank’s objectives, policy formulation, and limits on lending). It includes two CBI indices and a regional diffusion variable. The broader coverage of this dataset has important implications. First, although this dataset coding decisions are generally consistent with previous research, countries included only in this dataset tend to have lower CBI and differ in other dimensions with those previously coded. This suggests that systematically missing data in other data sources may have effects on inferences. Second, extended temporal coverage allows analyzing the evolution of central bank governance for more than a decade since the Global Financial Crisis. Finally, the data show that although there is a global tendency towards more CBI, there is significant variance across and within regions, including numerous reforms reducing CBI in the past two decades. This data contribution is important for research beyond the study of monetary institutions and their effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Garriga, Ana Carolina, 2025. "Revisiting Central Bank Independence in the World: An Extended Dataset," MPRA Paper 123578, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:123578
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/123578/1/MPRA_paper_123578.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cristina Bodea & Raymond Hicks, 2018. "Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 340-365, November.
    2. Zhiyuan Wang, 2023. "Unemployment, central bank independence, and diversionary conflict," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(4), pages 612-638, July.
    3. Goodhart, Charles & Lastra, Rosa, 2024. "The changing and growing roles of independent central banks now do require a reconsideration of their mandate," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Davide Romelli, 2022. "The political economy of reforms in Central Bank design: evidence from a new dataset," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 37(112), pages 641-688.
    5. Ballard-Rosa, Cameron & Mosley, Layna & Wellhausen, Rachel L., 2022. "Coming to Terms: The Politics of Sovereign Bond Denomination," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 32-69, January.
    6. Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2023. "Determinants of Green Innovation: The Role of Monetary Policy and Central Bank Characteristics," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(10), pages 1-23, May.
    7. Daniel Albalate del Sol, 2013. "The institutional, economic and social determinants of local government transparency," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 90-107.
    8. Wansleben, Leon, 2018. "How expectations became governable: institutional change and the performative power of central banks," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 91316, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2023. "Central bank independence and inflation volatility in developing countries," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1320-1341.
    10. Daniel Albalate del Sol, 2013. "The institutional, economic and social determinants of local government transparency," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 90-107, March.
    11. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    12. Klomp, Jeroen, 2020. "Do natural disasters affect monetary policy? A quasi-experiment of earthquakes," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    13. Ilan Goldfajn & Lorenza Martínez & Rodrigo O. Valdés, 2021. "Washington Consensus in Latin America: From Raw Model to Straw Man," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 109-132, Summer.
    14. Hyunwoo Kim, 2023. "Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability: how central bank independence conditions economic voting," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 939-964, May.
    15. Bianchi, Francesco & Gómez-Cram, Roberto & Kind, Thilo & Kung, Howard, 2023. "Threats to central bank independence: High-frequency identification with twitter," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 37-54.
    16. Sawa Omori, 2024. "Do institutions matter? Political economy of the enhancement of banking supervision," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(1), pages 73-83, March.
    17. Amy Pond, 2021. "Biased politicians and independent agencies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(3), pages 279-299, July.
    18. Daniel Hansen, 2023. "The democratic (dis)advantage: The conditional impact of democracy on credit risk and sovereign default," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 356-410, March.
    19. Jakob Haan & Christina Bodea & Raymond Hicks & Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger, 2018. "Central Bank Independence Before and After the Crisis," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 60(2), pages 183-202, June.
    20. Michael A. Gavin, 2020. "Independent central banks and banking crisis liquidity," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 109-131, January.
    21. Betz, Timm & Pond, Amy, 2023. "Democratic institutions and regulatory privileges for government debt," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    22. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2016. "Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 849-868, October.
    23. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    24. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2020. "More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 87-105.
    25. Berger, Wolfram & Kißmer, Friedrich, 2013. "Central bank independence and financial stability: A tale of perfect harmony?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 109-118.
    26. Jeroen Klomp & John Sseruyange, 2021. "Earthquakes and Economic Outcomes: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 335-359, April.
    27. Deborah Mabbett & Waltraud Schelkle, 2019. "Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(3), pages 436-460, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. & de Haan, Jakob, 2026. "Central bank independence: An update," IMFS Working Paper Series 229, Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS).
    2. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Gavin, Michael A., 2025. "Influence by omission: The IMF’s lending capacity and central bank design," MPRA Paper 125739, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Hill, Samuel & Khadan, Jeetendra & Selcuk, Peter Metin, 2025. "Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations : Intertwined Crises, Multiple Vulnerabilities," Policy Research Working Paper Series 11210, The World Bank.
    4. Saidi, Hichem & Ozturk, Ilhan & Hakimi, Abdelaziz & Ullah, Sana, 2026. "Central bank independence–green investment nexus: Is energy inflation a barrier or stimulator?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    5. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2025. "Balancing Act or Policy Pitfall? The Effects of Central Bank Dual Mandates," MPRA Paper 125925, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Bearce, David H. & Garriga, Ana Carolina, 2025. "Reconsidering the Relationship between CBI and FIX," MPRA Paper 125748, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Makram El-Shagi & Florian Gerth & Paul Lukuliko Philemon, 2026. "Rules vs. Discretion and the Role of the Central Bank," CFDS Discussion Paper Series 2026/2, Center for Financial Development and Stability at Henan University, Kaifeng, Henan, China.
    8. Iorngurum, Tersoo David, 2025. "Asymmetric overnight rate pass-through to bank loan rates: A meta-analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    9. Tiberto, Bruno Pires, 2025. "How does central bank independence influence the relationship between inflation, income inequality and poverty?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    10. Leek, Lauren & Bischl, Simeon, 2025. "How central bank independence shapes monetary policy communication: A Large Language Model application," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. DiGiuseppe, Matthew & Garriga, Ana Carolina & Kern, Andreas, 2025. "Information, Party Politics, and Public Support for Central Bank Independence," SocArXiv trpgz_v1, Center for Open Science.
    2. Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Sowerbutts, Rhiannon & Whitworth, Andrew, 2025. "Does regulatory and supervisory independence affect financial stability?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
    3. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Garriga, Ana Carolina & Rodriguez, Cesar M., 2023. "Central bank independence and inflation volatility in developing countries," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1320-1341.
    5. Leek, Lauren & Bischl, Simeon, 2025. "How central bank independence shapes monetary policy communication: A Large Language Model application," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    6. Aziz N. Berdiev & James W. Saunoris, 2023. "The case for independence: Does central bank independence curb the spread of the underground economy?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(3), pages 407-435, August.
    7. Kern, Andreas & Reinsberg, Bernhard & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2019. "IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 212-229.
    8. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    9. Giovanni B. Pittaluga & Elena Seghezza & Pierluigi Morelli, 2024. "The myth of federal reserve de facto independence," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 1675-1702, November.
    10. Bearce, David H. & Garriga, Ana Carolina, 2025. "Reconsidering the Relationship between CBI and FIX," MPRA Paper 125748, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Reinsberg, Bernhard & Kern, Andreas & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2021. "The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    12. Hyunwoo Kim, 2023. "Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability: how central bank independence conditions economic voting," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 939-964, May.
    13. Kwabi, Frank O. & Boateng, Agyenim & Du, Min, 2020. "Impact of central bank independence and transparency on international equity portfolio allocation: A cross-country analysis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    14. Jeroen Klomp & John Sseruyange, 2021. "Earthquakes and Economic Outcomes: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 335-359, April.
    15. Tiberto, Bruno Pires, 2025. "How does central bank independence influence the relationship between inflation, income inequality and poverty?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    16. Leek, Lauren Caroline & Bischl, Simeon, 2024. "How Central Bank Independence Shapes Monetary Policy Communication: A Large Language Model Application," SocArXiv yrhka, Center for Open Science.
    17. Angelos Athanasopoulos & Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2025. "Long run inflation: persistence and central bank independence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 25237, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    18. repec:osf:socarx:yrhka_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Abeeb O. Olaniran & Umar B. Ndako, 2025. "Independence Of Central Banks In Nondemocratic Regimes: Implications For Price Stability," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 28(3), pages 333-348, October.
    20. Lucia Quaglia & Amy Verdun, 2025. "The European Central Bank: From a Price Stability Paradigm to a Multidimensional Stability Paradigm," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 13.
    21. Ferrara, Federico M. & Masciandaro, Donato & Moschella, Manuela & Romelli, Davide, 2022. "Political voice on monetary policy: Evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • Y10 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Data: Tables and Charts - - - Data: Tables and Charts

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:123578. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.