How expectations became governable: institutional change and the performative power of central banks
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More about this item
Keywordsexpectations; financialization; monetarism; monetary policy; neoliberal institutional change; performativity;
All these keywords.
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBA-2019-01-07 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2019-01-07 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2019-01-07 (Monetary Economics)
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