Influence by omission: The IMF’s lending capacity and central bank design

A large literature explores how loan conditionalities and policy recommendations embedded in International Monetary Fund lending programs influence country behavior and policy choices. We argue that the IMF’s influence extends beyond these intentional efforts. This paper shows that the growth in the IMF’s lending capacity has failed to keep pace with financial globalization, and that this has incentivized emerging and developing economies to strengthen their domestic institutions for financial stability, particularly, their central bank’s capabilities to act as a lender of last resort. We conceptualize this as influence by omission, whereby the IMF shapes behavior not through direct engagement but through its declining ability to serve as an effective financial backstop. Using original data coding central bank lender of last resort powers for 60 developing countries between 1994 and 2020, we find that countries with relatively limited access to IMF resources are significantly more likely to strengthen their central banks’ lender of last resort authority. This finding is robust across a range of model specifications, instrumental variable analyses, and dynamic estimations. An event study of countries’ response to the Covid shock reveals that countries with stronger lending of last resort capabilities were much more likely to manage the crisis without drawing on IMF resources. Importantly, this effect is specific to lender of last resort powers and does not extend to other aspects of central bank governance such as independence or transparency, suggesting that distinct international and domestic incentives shape different reform trajectories.