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A note on non-competes, bargaining and training by firms

Author

Listed:
  • Nicola Meccheri

Abstract

This paper analyzes how non-competes, via wage bargaining, can affect firms ?T incentives to provide their employees with on-the-job training. The results show that non-competes increase incentives to provide general training, but reduce those related to specific training.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Meccheri, 2008. "A note on non-competes, bargaining and training by firms," Discussion Papers 2008/72, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:pie:dsedps:2008/72
    Note: ISSN 2039-1854
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    File URL: https://www.ec.unipi.it/documents/Ricerca/papers/2008-72.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1995. "Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 336-367, May.
    2. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2006. "The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: on the Interaction of General and Specific Investments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 903-923, October.
    3. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 1999. "Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 112-142, February.
    4. James M. Malcomson, 1997. "Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(4), pages 1916-1957, December.
    5. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-837, September.
    6. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
    7. Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
    8. Fella, Giulio, 2005. "Termination restrictions and investment in general training," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1479-1499, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Gori, 2009. "Endogenous fertility, family policy and multiple equilibria," Discussion Papers 2009/79, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    2. Manuela Gussoni & Andrea Mangani, 2012. "The Impact of Public Funding for Innovation on Firms' R&D Investments: Do R&D Cooperation and Appropriability Matter?," L'industria, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 237-254.
    3. Martins, Pedro S. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 2022. "Training, Worker Mobility, and Employer Coordination," IZA Discussion Papers 15488, IZA Network @ LISER.
    4. Evan Starr & Natarajan Balasubramanian & Natarajan Balasubramanian, 2018. "Screening Spinouts? How Noncompete Enforceability Affects the Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 552-572, February.
    5. F.C. Stam, 2019. "The Case against Non-Compete Agreements," Working Papers 19-20, Utrecht School of Economics.
    6. Gopal, Bhargav & Li, Xiangru & Rawling, Luke, 2025. "Do non-compete agreements help or hurt workers? Evidence from the NLSY97," CLEF Working Paper Series 89, Canadian Labour Economics Forum (CLEF), University of Waterloo.
    7. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2011. "On economic growth and minimum wages," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 59-82, May.
    8. Evan Starr & Natarajan Balasubramanian & Mariko Sakakibara, 2014. "Enforcing Covenants Not To Compete: The Life-Cycle Impact On New Firms," Working Papers 14-27, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    9. Pedro S. Martins & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2023. "Employers associations, worker mobility, and training," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp653, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    10. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2009. "Longevity, fertility and PAYG pension systems sustainability," Discussion Papers 2009/77, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    11. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2012. "Endogenous Lifetime in an Overlapping-Generations Small Open Economy," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 68(2), pages 121-152, June.
    12. Jose Azar & Ioana Marinescu, 2024. "Monopsony Power in the Labor Market," RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series 2431, ROCKWOOL Foundation Berlin (RFBerlin).
    13. Evan Starr, 2019. "Consider This: Training, Wages, and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 783-817, August.
    14. Gerald A. Carlino, 2017. "Do Non-Compete Covenants Influence State Startup Activity? Evidence from the Michigan Experiment," Working Papers 17-30, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    15. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2023. "Noncompete agreements, training, and wage competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 328-347, April.
    16. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2010. "Child policy solutions for the unemployment problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 147-149, December.
    17. Lorenzo Corsini & Pier Mario Pacini & Luca Spataro, 2010. "Workers' Choice on Pension Schemes: an Assessment of the Italian TFR Reform Through Theory and Simulations," Discussion Papers 2010/96, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    18. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2008. "PAYG pensions and economic cycles: exogenous versus endogenous fertility," Discussion Papers 2008/75, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    19. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2009. "Endogenous fertility, endogenous lifetime and economic growth: the role of health and child policies," Discussion Papers 2009/91, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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