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Credible threats in a wage bargaining model with on-the-job search

  • Bartolucci, Cristian

This note shows that in standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search, renegotiation does not require mutual consent. If the worker needs a credible threat to trigger renegotiation, wages are renegotiated less frequently than in the original model.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 117 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 657-659

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:657-659
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  1. Shintaro Yamaguchi, 2007. "Job Search, Bargaining, and Wage Dynamics," Department of Economics Working Papers 2007-03, McMaster University.
  2. Matthew S. Dey & Christopher J. Flinn, 2005. "An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance Provision and Wage Determination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 571-627, 03.
  3. James Mabli & Christopher Flinn, 2007. "On-the-Job Search, Minimum Wages, and Labor Market Outcomes in an Equilibrium Bargaining Framework," 2007 Meeting Papers 791, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2003. "Wage bargaining with on-the-job search : theory and evidence," Research Unit Working Papers 0212, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
  5. Fabien Postel-Vinay & Hélène Turon, 2006. "On-the-job Search, Productivity Shocks, and the Individual Earnings Process," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 06/141, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  6. Malcomson, J.M., 1997. "Contracts, hold-up and labor markets," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9703, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  7. Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2002. "The Distribution of Earnings in an Equilibrium Search Model with State-Dependent Offers and Counteroffers," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00357753, HAL.
  8. Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2002. "Equilibrium wage dispersion with worker and employer heterogeneity," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/dc0ckec3fcb, Sciences Po.
  9. Cristian Bartolucci, 2013. "Gender Wage Gaps Reconsidered: A Structural Approach Using Matched Employer-Employee Data," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(4), pages 998-1034.
  10. repec:inr:wpaper:155908 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-37, September.
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