IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/par/dipeco/2019-ep01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Information insensitivity, collateral flows and the logic of financial stability

Author

Listed:
  • A. Mantovi

Abstract

The role of collateralization in the dynamics of credit and liquidity provision is the subject of increasing research interest, for instance concerning the global macroeconomic role of safe assets. Still, when it comes to first principles of financial stability, questions of transparency seem to overshadow the relevance of collateralization arrangements and the specificity of networks of counterparties. According to Holmström (2015), the fact that liquidity requires transparency is a misunderstanding. The paper is meant to deepen the connection between the principle of “no questions asked” (NQA) on collateralized debt and the stabilizing properties of collateral flows in an equilibrium selection perspective. Conceptual and empirical implications are thoroughly discussed, and can be conjectured to represent lines of progress for the logic of financial stability, and for the theory of money as well. In a well known formula, money is a substitute for trust (Shubik, 1999); an analogous role for the NQA principle – collateral is a substitute for questions – can be conjectured to deserve comparable relevance.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Mantovi, 2019. "Information insensitivity, collateral flows and the logic of financial stability," Economics Department Working Papers 2019-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    • Handle: RePEc:par:dipeco:2019-ep01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.swrwebeco.unipr.it/RePEc/pdf/I_2019-01.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Stefan Nagel & Dmitry Orlov, 2014. "Sizing Up Repo," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(6), pages 2381-2417, December.
    2. Jean Tirole, 2011. "Illiquidity and All Its Friends," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 287-325, June.
    3. Enrico Biffis & David Blake & Lorenzo Pitotti & Ariel Sun, 2016. "The Cost of Counterparty Risk and Collateralization in Longevity Swaps," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 83(2), pages 387-419, June.
    4. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2009. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2201-2238, June.
    5. Duffie, Darrell, 2016. "Financial Regulatory Reform after the Crisis: An Assessment," Research Papers 3440, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015. "Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 564-608, February.
    7. Tri Vi Dang & Gary Gorton & Bengt Holmström & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2017. "Banks as Secret Keepers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(4), pages 1005-1029, April.
    8. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    9. Perry Mehrling, 2012. "Three Principles for Market-Based Credit Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 107-112, May.
    10. Zhiguo He & Arvind Krishnamurthy & Konstantin Milbradt, 2019. "A Model of Safe Asset Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1230-1262, April.
    11. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2001. "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 287-327, April.
    12. Nicolae Gârleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2011. "Margin-based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 1980-2022.
    13. Denis Gromb & Dimitri Vayanos, 2018. "The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(4), pages 1713-1750, August.
    14. DeAngelo, Harry & Stulz, René M., 2015. "Liquid-claim production, risk management, and bank capital structure: Why high leverage is optimal for banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 219-236.
    15. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis & David Andolfatto, 2010. "On the Social Cost of Transparency in Monetary Economies," 2010 Meeting Papers 980, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2009. "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 77-100, Winter.
    17. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, 2002. "Evil Is the Root of All Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 62-66, May.
    18. Pablo Kurlat, 2018. "Liquidity as Social Expertise," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 619-656, April.
    19. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Paul Krugman, 2012. "Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(3), pages 1469-1513.
    20. Gary Gorton, 2017. "The History and Economics of Safe Assets," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 9(1), pages 547-586, September.
    21. Mr. Manmohan Singh, 2017. "Collateral Reuse and Balance Sheet Space," IMF Working Papers 2017/113, International Monetary Fund.
    22. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, 2001. "Evil is the Root of all Money (Clarendon Lectures 1)," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 110, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    23. Ricardo J. Caballero & Emmanuel Farhi & Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, 2017. "The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 29-46, Summer.
    24. Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2010. "Amplification Mechanisms in Liquidity Crises," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 1-30, July.
    25. Shekhar Aiyar & Charles W Calomiris & Tomasz Wieladek, 2015. "Bank Capital Regulation: Theory, Empirics, and Policy," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 63(4), pages 955-983, November.
    26. Williamson, Stephen D., 2016. "Scarce collateral, the term premium, and quantitative easing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 136-165.
    27. Michel Dacorogna & Marc Busse, 2017. "The Price of Being a Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI)," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 17(4), pages 611-616, December.
    28. Viral V. Acharya & Nada Mora, 2015. "A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(1), pages 1-43, February.
    29. Zoltan Pozsar, 2014. "Shadow Banking: The Money View," Working Papers 14-04, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    30. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    31. Bengtsson, Elias, 2013. "Shadow banking and financial stability: European money market funds in the global financial crisis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 579-594.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrea Mantovi, 2018. "The monetary dimension of arbitrage. A brief note," Working Paper series 18-27, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, revised Oct 2018.
    2. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95.
    3. Donaldson, Jason & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2019. "Money Runs," CEPR Discussion Papers 13955, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Goldstein, Itay & Razin, Assaf, 2015. "Three Branches of Theories of Financial Crises," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 10(2), pages 113-180, 30.
    5. Benedikt Ballensiefen & Angelo Ranaldo, 2023. "Safe Asset Carry Trade," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(2), pages 223-265.
    6. Kristian Blickle & Markus K. Brunnermeier & Stephan Luck, 2022. "Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail?," NBER Working Papers 29753, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. He, Zhiguo & Nagel, Stefan & Song, Zhaogang, 2022. "Treasury inconvenience yields during the COVID-19 crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 57-79.
    8. Kreamer, Jonathan, 2022. "Financial intermediation and the supply of liquidity," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    9. Xuewen Liu, 2023. "A Model of Systemic Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 731-793, April.
    10. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1221-1288, Elsevier.
    11. Jason R. Donaldson & Giorgia Piacentino, 2019. "Money Runs," NBER Working Papers 26298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Hanson, Samuel G. & Shleifer, Andrei & Stein, Jeremy C. & Vishny, Robert W., 2015. "Banks as patient fixed-income investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 449-469.
    13. Diana Bonfim & Moshe Kim, 2012. "Liquidity risk in banking: is there herding?," Working Papers w201218, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    14. Silva, Walmir & Kimura, Herbert & Sobreiro, Vinicius Amorim, 2017. "An analysis of the literature on systemic financial risk: A survey," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 91-114.
    15. Chen, Qi & Goldstein, Itay & Huang, Zeqiong & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2022. "Bank transparency and deposit flows," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 475-501.
    16. Roberto Robatto, 2015. "Financial Crises and Systemic Bank Runs in a Dynamic Model of Banking," 2015 Meeting Papers 483, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Becker, Christoph, 2021. "The liquidity mechanics of dealer banks in the market-based credit system," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    18. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Micheler, Eva, 2018. "Resaleable debt and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 485-504.
    19. Wiersema, Garbrand & Kleinnijenhuis, Alissa M. & Wetzer, Thom & Farmer, J. Doyne, 2023. "Scenario-free analysis of financial stability with interacting contagion channels," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    20. Anne-Marie Rieu-Foucault, 2017. "Point sur la fourniture de liquidié publique," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-27, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Money; Financial Stability; Information Sensitivity; Market Design; Equilibrium Selection; Political Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:par:dipeco:2019-ep01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Andrea Lasagni (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feparit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.