In-group favouritism and out-group discimination in naturally occurring groups
We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game.� An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self.� Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members.� The three groups are supporters of the two rival political movements in Thailand (â€œyellow shirtsâ€ versus â€œred shirtsâ€) and political neutral subjects.� A control treatment with artificial groups (â€œgroup Aâ€, â€œgroup Bâ€, and â€œnon-affiliatedâ€) is also conducted.� We find that allocators strongly favour their own group and discriminate against supporters of the rival party.� Despite a strong anti-corruption stance of the yellow-shirt movement members of both political groups are indistinguishable in both favouritism and discrimination.� Allocators tend to be rather selfish: on average 45% of the pie is given to Self, despite the large number of recipients.
|Date of creation:||02 Jul 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klor, Esteban F & Shayo, Moses, 2007.
"Social Identity and Preferences over Redistribution,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Klor, Esteban F. & Shayo, Moses, 2010. "Social identity and preferences over redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 269-278, April.
- McLeish, Kendra N. & Oxoby, Robert J., 2007. "Identity, Cooperation, and Punishment," IZA Discussion Papers 2572, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- C. Monica Capra & Lei Li, 2006. "Conformity in Contribution Games: Gender and Group Effects," Emory Economics 0601, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
- Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper & Enrique Fatas, 2006.
"Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs,"
298, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Jordi Brandts & David Cooper & Enrique Fatas, 2007. "Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 269-284, September.
- Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper & Enrique Fatas, 2006. "Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 691.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Güth, Werner & Levati, M. Vittoria & Ploner, Matteo, 2008.
"Social identity and trust--An experimental investigation,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics),
Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1293-1308, August.
- Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2007. "Social identity and trust - An experimental investigation," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-41, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Gary Bornstein & Tamar Kugler & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2002. "Individual and Group Decisions in the Centipede Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players?," Discussion Paper Series dp298, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Buchan, Nancy R. & Johnson, Eric J. & Croson, Rachel T.A., 2006. "Let's get personal: An international examination of the influence of communication, culture and social distance on other regarding preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 373-398, July.
- Matteo Ploner & Ivan Soraperra, 2004. "Groups and Social Norms in the Economic Context: A Preliminary Experimental Investigation," CEEL Working Papers 0403, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:616. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.