IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/21810.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Dynamics of Adjustable-Rate Subprime Mortgage Default: A Structural Estimation

Author

Listed:
  • Hanming Fang
  • You Suk Kim
  • Wenli Li

Abstract

We present a dynamic structural model of subprime adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) borrowers making payment decisions taking into account possible consequences of different degrees of delinquency from their lenders. We empirically implement the model using unique data sets that contain information on borrowers' mortgage payment history, their broad balance sheets, and lender responses. Our investigation of the factors that drive borrowers' decisions reveals that subprime ARMs are not all alike. For loans originated in 2004 and 2005, the interest rate resets associated with ARMs, as well as the housing and labor market conditions were not as important in borrowers' delinquency decisions as in their decisions to pay off their loans. For loans originated in 2006, interest rate resets, housing price declines, and worsening labor market conditions all contributed importantly to their high delinquency rates. Counterfactual policy simulations reveal that even if the Libor rate could be lowered to zero by aggressive traditional monetary policies, it would have a limited effect on reducing the delinquency rates. We find that automatic modification mortgage designs under which the monthly payment or the principal balance of the loans are automatically reduced when housing prices decline can be effective in reducing both delinquency and foreclosure. Importantly, we find that automatic modification mortgages with a cushion, under which the monthly payment or principal balance reductions are triggered only when housing price declines exceed a certain percentage may result in a Pareto improvement in that borrowers and lenders are both made better off than under the baseline, with a lower delinquency and foreclosure rates. Our counterfactual analysis also suggests that limited commitment power on the part of the lenders to loan modification policies may be an important reason for the relatively small rate of modifications observed during the housing crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanming Fang & You Suk Kim & Wenli Li, 2015. "The Dynamics of Adjustable-Rate Subprime Mortgage Default: A Structural Estimation," NBER Working Papers 21810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21810
    Note: CF PE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21810.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rust, John, 1987. "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 999-1033, September.
    2. Sumit Agarwal & Gene Amromin & Itzhak Ben-David & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2017. "Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(3), pages 654-712.
    3. Carlos Hatchondo, Juan & Martinez, Leonardo & Sánchez, Juan M., 2015. "Mortgage defaults," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 173-190.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Juan M. Sanchez, 2011. "Mortgage defaults," Working Papers 2011-019, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 31 Jul 2015.
      • Leonardo Martinez & Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Juan M. Sanchez, 2012. "Mortgage Defaults," IMF Working Papers 12/26, International Monetary Fund.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Juan M. Sanchez, 2011. "Mortgage defaults," Working Paper 11-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, revised 2011.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Juan M. Sanchez, 2015. "Mortgage Defaults," CAEPR Working Papers 2015-011, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    4. Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, 2009. "A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 575-607.
    5. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2015. "A Quantitative Analysis of the US Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 165-184, April.
    6. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226081946 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Willen, Paul S., 2013. "Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 835-853.
    8. Kristopher Gerardi & Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Lee E. Ohanian & Paul S. Willen, 2018. "Can’t Pay or Won’t Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(3), pages 1098-1131.
    9. Patrick Bajari & Chenghuan Sean Chu & Denis Nekipelov & Minjung Park, 2013. "A Dynamic Model of Subprime Mortgage Default: Estimation and Policy Implications," NBER Working Papers 18850, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. John Y. Campbell & Stefano Giglio & Parag Pathak, 2011. "Forced Sales and House Prices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 2108-2131, August.
    11. Agarwal, Sumit & Amromin, Gene & Ben-David, Itzhak & Chomsisengphet, Souphala & Evanoff, Douglas D., 2010. "Market-Based Loss Mitigation Practices for Troubled Mortgages Following the Financial Crisis," Working Paper Series 2010-19, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21810. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.