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The U.S. Debt Restructuring of 1933: Consequences and Lessons

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  • Sebastian Edwards
  • Francis A. Longstaff
  • Alvaro Garcia Marin

Abstract

In 1933, the U.S. unilaterally restructured its debt by declaring that it would no longer honor the gold clause in Treasury securities. We study the effects of the abrogation of the gold clause on sovereign debt markets, the Treasury's ability to issue new debt, investors' willingness to hold Treasury bonds, and on the Treasury's borrowing costs. We find that the restructuring was followed by a flight to quality in the sovereign market. Despite this, there was little effect on the Treasury's ability to sell new debt or the willingness of investors to roll over restructured debt. The Treasury incurred a marginally higher cost of capital by issuing new bonds without the gold clause.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Edwards & Francis A. Longstaff & Alvaro Garcia Marin, 2015. "The U.S. Debt Restructuring of 1933: Consequences and Lessons," NBER Working Papers 21694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21694
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    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

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