IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/20925.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Voting on Prices vs. Voting on Quantities in a World Climate Assembly

Author

Listed:
  • Martin L. Weitzman

Abstract

This paper posits the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic "World Climate Assembly" that votes on global carbon emissions via the basic principle of majority rule. Two variants are considered. One is to vote on a universal price (or tax) that is internationally harmonized, but the proceeds from which are domestically retained. The other is to vote on the overall quantity of total worldwide emissions, which are then distributed for free (via a pre-decided fractional subdivision formula) as individual allowance permits that are subsequently marketed in an international cap-and-trade system. The model of the paper suggests that the majority-voted price is likely to be less distortionary and easier to enact than the majority-voted total quantity of permits. While the study is centered on a formal model, the tone of the policy discussion resembles more an exploratory think piece.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin L. Weitzman, 2015. "Voting on Prices vs. Voting on Quantities in a World Climate Assembly," NBER Working Papers 20925, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20925
    Note: EEE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20925.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    2. Gary D. Libecap, 2013. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," NBER Working Papers 19501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Goulder, Lawrence H. & Hafstead, Marc A.C. & Dworsky, Michael, 2010. "Impacts of alternative emissions allowance allocation methods under a federal cap-and-trade program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 161-181, November.
    4. Martin L. Weitzman, 2014. "Can Negotiating a Uniform Carbon Price Help to Internalize the Global Warming Externality?," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 29-49.
    5. Valentina Bosetti & Jeffrey Frankel, 2014. "Sustainable Cooperation In Global Climate Policy: Specific Formulas And Emission Targets," Climate Change Economics (CCE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 1-34.
    6. Geir Asheim, 2013. "A Distributional Argument for Supply-Side Climate Policies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 239-254, October.
    7. Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew Schein, 2013. "Carbon Taxes vs. Cap and Trade: A Critical Review," NBER Working Papers 19338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Barrett, Scott, 2005. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199286096.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Matthew J. Kotchen, 2016. "Which Social Cost of Carbon? A Theoretical Perspective," NBER Working Papers 22246, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Luigi De Paoli, 2015. "The fight against climate change: some proposals for action for Italy in Europe," ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(1), pages 9-27.
    3. Martin L. Weitzman, 2017. "On a World Climate Assembly and the Social Cost of Carbon," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(336), pages 559-586, October.
    4. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
    5. Christian Gollier and Jean Tirole, 2015. "Negotiating effective institutions against climate change," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20925. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.