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Shadow Insurance

  • Ralph S.J. Koijen
  • Motohiro Yogo

Life insurers use reinsurance to move liabilities from regulated and rated companies that sell policies to shadow reinsurers, which are less regulated and unrated off-balance-sheet entities within the same insurance group. U.S. life insurance and annuity liabilities ceded to shadow reinsurers grew from $11 billion in 2002 to $364 billion in 2012. Life insurers using shadow insurance, which capture half of the market share, ceded 25 cents of every dollar insured to shadow reinsurers in 2012, up from 2 cents in 2002. By relaxing capital requirements, shadow insurance could reduce the marginal cost of issuing policies and thereby improve retail market efficiency. However, shadow insurance could also reduce risk-based capital and increase expected loss for the industry. We model and quantify these effects based on publicly available data and plausible assumptions.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19568.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19568.

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Date of creation: Oct 2013
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Publication status: published as Ralph S. J. Koijen & Motohiro Yogo, 2016. "Shadow Insurance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1265-1287, 05.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19568
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  1. Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Motohiro Yogo & Ralph S. J. Koijen, 2011. "Health and Mortality Delta: Assessing the Welfare Cost of Household Insurance Choice," 2011 Meeting Papers 633, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Froot, Kenneth A., 2001. "The market for catastrophe risk: a clinical examination," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 529-571, May.
  3. Motohiro Yogo & Ralph Koijen, 2012. "The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life Insurers," 2012 Meeting Papers 83, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Acharya, Viral V & Schnabl, Philipp & Suarez, Gustavo, 2012. "Securitization Without Risk Transfer," CEPR Discussion Papers 8769, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Adiel, Ron, 1996. "Reinsurance and the management of regulatory ratios and taxes in the property--casualty insurance industry," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-3), pages 207-240, October.
  6. Andrew Ellul & Chotibhak Jotikasthira & Christian T. Lundblad & Yihui Wang, 2012. "Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress, Incentive Distortions, and Gains Trading," FMG Discussion Papers dp701, Financial Markets Group.
  7. Zoltan Pozsar & Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky, 2010. "Shadow banking," Staff Reports 458, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  8. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Paul Schrimpf, 2010. "Optimal Mandates and the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence From the U.K. Annuity Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 1031-1092, 05.
  9. Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Motohiro Yogo & Ralph S.J. Koijen, 2009. "Optimal Health and Longevity Insurance," 2009 Meeting Papers 185, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. Bo Becker & Victoria Ivashina, 2013. "Reaching for Yield in the Bond Market," NBER Working Papers 18909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Craig B. Merrill & Taylor D. Nadauld & René M. Stulz & Shane Sherlund, 2012. "Did Capital Requirements and Fair Value Accounting Spark Fire Sales in Distressed Mortgage-Backed Securities?," NBER Working Papers 18270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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