Institutional Comparative Statics
Why was the Black Death followed by the decline of serfdom in Western Europe but its' intensification in Eastern Europe? What explains why involvement in Atlantic trade in the Early Modern period was positively correlated with economic growth in Britain but negatively correlated in Spain? Why did frontier expansion in the 19th Century Americas go along with economic growth in the United States and economic decline in Latin America? Why do natural resource booms seem to stimulate growth in some countries, but lead to a 'curse' in others, and why does foreign aid sometimes seem to encourage, other times impede economic growth? In this paper we argue that the response of economies to shocks or innovations in economic opportunities depends on the nature of institutions. When institutions are strong, new opportunities or windfalls can have positive effects. But when institutions are weak they can have negative effects. We present a simple model to illustrate how comparative statics are conditional on the nature of institutions and show how this perspective helps to unify a large number of historical episodes and empirical studies.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2011|
|Publication status:||published as “Instituti onal Comparative Statics” (2013) ( joint with Ragnar Torvik, University of Trondheim) Daron Acemoglu, Manuel Arellano and Eddie Dekel eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics : Tenth World Congress, Volume II, Applied Economics , New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 97 - 134.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sachs, J-D & Warner, A-M, 1995.
"Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,"
517a, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002.
"Institutions and the resource curse,"
Development and Comp Systems
- Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar, 2003. "Institutions and the resource curse," Memorandum 29/2002, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2004. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," DEGIT Conference Papers c009_012, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," GE, Growth, Math methods 0210004, EconWPA.
- Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2011.
"The Economics of Labor Coercion,"
Econometric Society, vol. 79(2), pages 555-600, 03.
- Lvarez-Nogal, Carlos & Prados De La Escosura, Leandro, 2007. "The decline of Spain (1500 1850): conjectural estimates," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(03), pages 319-366, December.
- Wright, Gavin, 1990. "The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-1940," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 651-668, September.
- Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2006.
"Political foundations of the resource curse,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 447-468, April.
- Robinson, James A & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2002. "Political Foundations of the Resource Curse," CEPR Discussion Papers 3422, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik & Thierry Verdier, 2003. "Politcal Foundations of the Resource Curse," DELTA Working Papers 2003-33, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Kevin H. O'Rourke & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2001. "Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650592, December.
- Kemp, Murray C & Shimomura, Koji, 2002. "The Sonnenschein-Debreu-Mantel Proposition and the Theory of International Trade," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 671-679, November.
- Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Aslaksen, Silje, 2008.
"Constitutions and the resource curse,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 227-246, October.
- Anne D. Boschini & Jan Pettersson & Jesper Roine, 2006.
"Resource curse or not: A question of appropriability,"
DEGIT Conference Papers
c011_050, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Anne D. Boschini & Jan Pettersson & Jesper Roine, 2007. "Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 593-617, 09.
- Boschini, Anne & Pettersson, Jan & Roine, Jesper, 2003. "Resource curse or not: A question of appropriability," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 534, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2007.
"Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2836, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
- Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
- Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
- Opp, Marcus M. & Sonnenschein, Hugo F. & Tombazos, Christis G., 2009. "Rybczynski's Theorem in the Heckscher-Ohlin World -- Anything Goes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 137-142, September.
- Jonathan Conning, 2004. "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis Revisited," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 401, Hunter College Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.