The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis Revisited
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- A quick, uninformed, probably wrong, and completely unoriginal resolution to the "Brenner Paradox"
by YouNotSneaky! in YouNotSneaky on 2009-01-31 14:34:00
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More about this item
KeywordsMonoposony; agrarian organization; inequality; tenancy; slavery; serfdom.;
- J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
- J43 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Agricultural Labor Markets
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-07-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2004-07-18 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HPE-2004-07-20 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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