IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Latifundia Economics

This paper proposes a simple general equilibrium theory of agrarian production organization to explain the emergence and persistence of latifundia - minifundia type patterns of agrarian production organization such as have prevailed historically in many parts of Latin America. When land ownership is concentrated, the exercise of market power over land can facilitate the exercise of control over labor, as labor supply to landlord estates is affected by peasant access to land. Equilibria may emerge where landlords, behaving as multimarket Cournot oligopolists, inefficiently hoard land to drive up land rentals and corral cheaper labor into their expanding estates. Labor-service tenancy arrangements, similar to those used in practice, emerge as landlords try to price discriminate. These contracts help to restore allocative inefficiency but lead to lower equilibrium peasant wages and welfare. Population growth, differential technical progress on landlord and peasant farms, and other changes in the physical and economic environment are shown to transform equilibrium patterns of agrarian production organization in ways that are consistent with agrarian trajectories observed in late nineteenth century Chile and several other regions and periods. The model also clarifies how agentsÂ’ incentives to challenge property rights change along with equilibrium agrarian structures.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/conninglatifundia.pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Williams College in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2001-08.

as
in new window

Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2001-08
Contact details of provider: Postal: Williamstown, MA 01267
Phone: 413 597 2476
Fax: 413 597 4045
Web page: http://econ.williams.eduEmail:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Conning, Jonathan H & Robinson, James A, 2002. "Land Reform and the Political Organization of Agriculture," CEPR Discussion Papers 3204, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. MICHAEL R. CARTER & Frederic Zimmerman, 1998. "The Dynamic Cost and Persistence of Asset Inequality in an Agrarian Economy," Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Staff Papers 416, Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Department.
  3. Baland, Jean-Marie & Robinson, James A, 2003. "Land and Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 3800, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Cornia, Giovanni Andrea, 1985. "Farm size, land yields and the agricultural production function: An analysis for fifteen developing countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 513-534, April.
  5. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1995. "Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 42, pages 2659-2772 Elsevier.
  6. Schaffner, Julie Anderson, 1995. "Attached farm labor, limited horizons and servility," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 241-270, August.
  7. Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1992. "Labor-Service Tenancy Contracts in a Latin American Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1031-42, September.
  8. Nugent, Jeffrey B & Robinson, James A, 2002. "Are Endowments Fate?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Michael Kevane, 1996. "Agrarian Structure and Agricultural Practice: Typology and Application to Western Sudan," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(1), pages 236-245.
  10. McCulloch, Rachel & Yellen, Janet L., 1980. "Factor market monopsony and the allocation of resources," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 237-247, May.
  11. Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engerman, 2000. "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 217-232, Summer.
  12. James R. Markusen & Arthur J. Robson, 1980. "Simple General Equilibrium and Trade with a Monopsonized Sector," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(4), pages 668-82, November.
  13. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1986. "Access to Capital and Agrarian Production Organisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(382), pages 482-98, June.
  14. Dilip Mookherjee, 1995. "Informational Rents and Property Rights in Land," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 55, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  15. Braverman, Avishay & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1982. "Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 695-715, September.
  16. Feenstra, Robert C., 1980. "Monopsony distortions in an open economy: A theoretical analysis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 213-235, May.
  17. Hotte, Louis, 2001. "Conflicts over property rights and natural-resource exploitation at the frontier," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 1-21, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:

  1. Latifundium in Wikipedia Indonesian ne '')
  2. Латифундија in Wikipedia Macedonian ne '')
  3. Usor:M0rphzone/Latifundium in Wikipedia Latin ne '')
  4. Latifundium in Wikipedia English ne '')
  5. Latifundium in Wikipedia Latin ne '')

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wil:wileco:2001-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stephen Sheppard)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.