Central Banks and the Financial System
Financial systems are inherently fragile because of the very function which makes them valuable: liquidity transformation. Regulatory reforms can strengthen the financial system and decrease the risk of liquidity crises, but they cannot eliminate it completely. This leaves monetary policy with a very important task. In a framework that recognizes the interactions between monetary policy and liquidity transformation 'optimal' monetary policy would consist of a modified Taylor rule in which the real rate reflects the possibility of liquidity crises and recognizes the possibility that liquidity transformation gets subsidized. Failure to recognize this point risks leading the economy into a low interest rate trap: low interest rates induce too much risk taking and increase the probability of crises. These crises, in turn, require low interest rates to maintain the financial system alive. Raising rates becomes extremely difficult in a severely weakened financial system, so monetary authorities remain stuck in a low interest rates trap. This seems a reasonable description of the situation we have experienced throughout the past decade.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as “Central Banks and Financial System”, in S. Eijffinger and D. Masciandaro (eds.), Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision After the Financial Crisis, Edward Elgar. (with Alberto Giovannini)|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jean Tirole, 2010.
"Illiquidity and all its friends,"
BIS Working Papers
303, Bank for International Settlements.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983.
"Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1998.
"Private and Public Supply of Liquidity,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 1-40, February.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," NBER Working Papers 5817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Holmstrom, B & Tirole, J, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Working papers 96-21, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16228. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.