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Lobbyin to prevent commercial piracy

  • Martínez-Sánchez, Francisco

    (Departamentos y Servicios::Departamentos de la UMU::Fundamentos del Análisis Económico)

In this paper we develop a common agency model to analyze the problem of pirates entering the market, in which the incumbent and the consumers form pressure groups to lobby the government on policies to prevent piracy while the pirates try to avoid being stopped. We show that a monopoly is not an equilibrium when both the incumbent and consumers lobby the government, and that the cost of monitoring commercial piracy is very important in determining (truthful) equilibria, as is the case where there is no lobby competition. However, it is now more difficult getting the pirate to enter the market.

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File URL: http://digitum.um.es/xmlui/bitstream/10201/13255/1/WPUMUFAE.2010.03.pdf
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Paper provided by DIGITUM. Universidad de Murcia in its series UMUFAE Economics Working Papers with number 13255.

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Length: 16
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mur:wpaper:13255
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.um.es/fee/

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  1. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
  2. Duchene, Anne & Waelbroeck, Patrick, 2006. "The legal and technological battle in the music industry: Information-push versus information-pull technologies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 565-580, December.
  3. Gil, Ricard, 2006. "The economics of IPR protection policies," IESE Research Papers D/622, IESE Business School.
  4. Banerjee, Dyuti S., 2006. "Lobbying and commercial software piracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 139-155, March.
  5. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
  6. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
  7. Banerjee, Dyuti S., 2003. "Software piracy: a strategic analysis and policy instruments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 97-127, January.
  8. Oz Shy & Jacques-Françlois Thisse, 1999. "A Strategic Approach to Software Protection," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 163-190, 06.
  9. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 93-128, September.
  10. Kiema, Ilkka, 2008. "Commercial piracy and intellectual property policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 304-318, October.
  11. Laussel Didier G, 2006. "Special Interest Politics and Endogenous Lobby Formation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-14, February.
  12. Gil Ricard, 2007. "The Economics of IPR Protection Policies: Reply," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(4), pages 1-5, December.
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