IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Economics of IPR Protection Policies

  • Gil Ricard

    ()

    (Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz)

In this paper, I model competition between legal and pirate products. In this framework, the government affects competition through police spending and taxes on the legal products. Therefore, the government can choose the optimal combination of spending and taxes that fit better its goals. I show that governments focusing on eradicating piracy will use lower level of taxes and police spending than governments focused on maximizing consumption, consumer surplus, and welfare or government size. This result highlights the importance of demand side policies in the fight against piracy and challenges the traditional solo approach of supply side policies.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne.2006.5.3/rne.2006.5.3.1099/rne.2006.5.3.1099.xml?format=INT
Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Review of Network Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 1-21

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:5:y:2006:i:3:n:1
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.degruyter.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. William Landes & Douglas Lichtman, 2003. "Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: Napster and Beyond," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 113-124, Spring.
  2. Wauthy, X., 1994. "Quality Choice in Models of Vertical Differentiation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1994033, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  3. Paul Romer, 2002. "When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 213-216, May.
  4. Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, 2004. "Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students," NBER Working Papers 10874, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Yeh-ning Chen & Ivan Png, 2004. "Parallel Imports and Music CD Prices," International Trade 0402001, EconWPA.
  6. Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, 1991. "An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 3-27, Winter.
  7. Dam, Kenneth W, 1999. "Self-Help in the Digital Jungle," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 393-412, June.
  8. Hal R. Varian, 2005. "Copying and Copyright," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 121-138, Spring.
  9. Hui Kai-Lung & Png Ivan, 2003. "Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded Music," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-24, September.
  10. Takeyama, Lisa N, 1997. "The Intertemporal Consequences of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 511-22, October.
  11. David Blackburn, 2002. "Complementarities and network externalities in casually copied goods," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 29(1 Year 20), pages 71-88, June.
  12. Takeyama, Lisa N, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 155-66, June.
  13. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13, January.
  14. Joshua Slive & Dan Bernhardt, 1998. "Pirated for Profit," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 886-899, November.
  15. Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner & Kevin M. Murphy, 2002. "The Economics of Copyright "Fair Use" in a Networked World," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 205-208, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:5:y:2006:i:3:n:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.