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Effect of piracy on innovation in the presence of network externalities

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  • Banerjee, Dyuti

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of simultaneous increases in piracy (piracy effect) and network externalities (network effect) on R&D investment. A single firm's R&D investment increases (or decreases) if the network effect (or piracy effect) is dominant. With R&D competition, if the firms “significantly” differ with respect to their R&D efficiencies and if the piracy effect dominates the network effect then the less efficient firm's R&D investment increases and that of the more efficient firm's decreases. In this case, the overall probability of successful innovation increases. The reverse holds if the network effect dominates the piracy effect. If the firms are “less” asymmetric then their R&D investment either increases or decreases depending on the relative strengths of the piracy and network effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee, Dyuti, 2013. "Effect of piracy on innovation in the presence of network externalities," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 526-532.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:33:y:2013:i:c:p:526-532
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.04.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Takeyama, Lisa N, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 155-166, June.
    2. Banerjee, Dyuti & Chatterjee, Ishita, 2010. "The impact of piracy on innovation in the presence of technological and market uncertainty," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 391-397, December.
    3. Kathleen Reavis Conner & Richard P. Rumelt, 1991. "Software Piracy: An Analysis of Protection Strategies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(2), pages 125-139, February.
    4. Sana El Harbi & Gilles Grolleau, 2008. "Profiting from Being Pirated by 'Pirating' the Pirates," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 385-390, August.
    5. Banerjee, Dyuti S., 2003. "Software piracy: a strategic analysis and policy instruments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 97-127, January.
    6. Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-246, April.
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    8. Yang, Xuebing, 2013. "Horizontal inventive step and international protection of intellectual property," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 338-355.
    9. Oz Shy & Jacques-Françlois Thisse, 1999. "A Strategic Approach to Software Protection," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 163-190, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aloui, Chokri & Jebsi, Khaïreddine, 2016. "Platform optimal capacity sharing: Willing to pay more does not guarantee a larger capacity share," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 276-288.
    2. repec:eee:proeco:v:205:y:2018:i:c:p:139-155 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Yi, Yuyin & Yang, Haishen, 2017. "An evolutionary stable strategy for retailers selling complementary goods subject to indirect network externalities," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 184-193.
    4. Yuanzhu Lu & Sougata Poddar, 2015. "Strategic Choice of Network Externality," Working Papers 2015-03, Auckland University of Technology, Department of Economics.
    5. Waters, James, 2015. "Welfare implications of piracy with dynamic pricing and heterogeneous consumers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(3), pages 904-911.
    6. Yuanzhu Lu & Sougata Poddar, 2015. "Does the Nature of Piracy and Competition Matter?," Working Papers 2015-04, Auckland University of Technology, Department of Economics.
    7. repec:kap:revind:v:52:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11151-017-9581-0 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Innovation; Market uncertainty; Network effect; Piracy effect; Technological uncertainty;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights

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