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Who wants the contrat de travail unique? Social support for labour market flexibilisation in France

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Abstract

A policy proposal is to abolish the distinction between regular open-end employment contracts and fixed-term contracts and substitute a unique labour contract with a degree of employment protection increasing with tenure. A question on the desirability of the "contrat unique" was included in the 2012 post-electoral survey. Using the answers to this question, this paper proposens an empirical analysis of the possible social basis for the contrat unique. Insider/outsider theories would predict that insiders would oppose such a reform whereas outsiders would welcome it. Beyond the theoretical and empirical problems associated with the definition and identification of insiders and outsiders, the results of the estimations do not bring an overwhelming support for the insider/outsider theories. The bulk of the social support for the CTU is made of "insiders". The social support for the contrat unique resembles the traditional social base of the Right with the addition of some "outsiders"

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Amable, 2013. "Who wants the contrat de travail unique? Social support for labour market flexibilisation in France," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13008, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:13008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2002. "The Political Economy of Employment Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 672-701, June.
    2. Bean, Charles R, 1994. "European Unemployment: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(2), pages 573-619, June.
    3. Bruno Amable & Lilas Demmou & Donatella Gatti, 2011. "The effect of employment protection and product market regulation on labour market performance: substitution or complementarity?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(4), pages 449-464.
    4. Rueda, David, 2005. "Insider–Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(1), pages 61-74, February.
    5. Bruno Amable & Ken Mayhew, 2011. "Unemployment in the OECD," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 27(2), pages 207-220.
    6. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "Why are European Countries Diverging in their Unemployment Experience?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 49-68, Fall.
    7. Eckhard Hein & Engelbert Stockhammer (ed.), 2011. "A Modern Guide to Keynesian Macroeconomics and Economic Policies," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13962.
    8. Dean Baker & Andrew Glyn & David Howell & John Schmitt, 2002. "Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment: A Critical Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence," SCEPA working paper series. 2002-17, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
    9. David N. F. Bell & David G. Blanchflower, 2011. "Young people and the Great Recession," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 27(2), pages 241-267.
    10. Rueda, David, 2006. "Social Democracy and Active Labour-Market Policies: Insiders, Outsiders and the Politics of Employment Promotion," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 385-406, July.
    11. Howell David R. & Baker Dean & Glyn Andrew & Schmitt John, 2007. "Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Review of the Evidence," Capitalism and Society, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-73, May.
    12. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2000. "The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198293323.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guillaud, Elvire & Marx, Paul, 2013. "Preferences for Employment Protection and the Insider-Outsider Divide," IZA Discussion Papers 7569, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Normann Rion, 2019. "Waiting for the Prince Charming: Fixed-Term Contracts as Stopgaps," Working Papers halshs-02331887, HAL.
    3. Bruno Amable, 2014. "The unsolved contradictions of the modernists. Economic policy expectations and political crisis in France 1978-2012," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00973926, HAL.
    4. Thomas Prosser & Giga Giorgadze, 2018. "Towards a theory of illiberal dualisation? Conceptualising new employment and social policy divisions in Poland and the United Kingdom," Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, , vol. 24(2), pages 151-162, May.
    5. Nils BRAAKMANN & Bernd BRANDL, 2021. "The performance effects of collective and individual bargaining: A comprehensive and granular analysis of the effects of different bargaining systems on company productivity," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 160(1), pages 43-64, March.
    6. Brigitte Granville & Jaume Martorell Cruz, 2016. "Squared Segmentation: How the Insider/Outsider divide across Public/Private Employment shapes attitudes towards markets," Working Papers 78, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contrat de travail unique/single labour contract; insider/outsider; political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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