Who wants the contrat de travail unique ? Social support for labour market flexibilisation in France
A policy proposal is to abolish the distinction between regular open-end employment contracts and fixed-term contracts and substitute a unique labour contract with a degree of employment protection increasing with tenure. A question on the desirability of the "contrat unique" was included in the 2012 post-electoral survey. Using the answers to this question, this paper proposens an empirical analysis of the possible social basis for the contrat unique. Insider/outsider theories would predict that insiders would oppose such a reform whereas outsiders would welcome it. Beyond the theoretical and empirical problems associated with the definition and identification of insiders and outsiders, the results of the estimations do not bring an overwhelming support for the insider/outsider theories. The bulk of the social support for the CTU is made of "insiders". The social support for the contrat unique resembles the traditional social base of the Right with the addition of some "outsiders".
|Date of creation:||Jan 2013|
|Publication status:||Published in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2013.08 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2013|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00785640|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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