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Who wants the Contrat de Travail Unique? Social Support for Labor Market Flexibilization in France

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno Amable

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPREMAP - Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications - ECO ENS-PSL - Département d'économie de l'ENS-PSL - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, IUF - Institut universitaire de France - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche)

Abstract

In France, a proposal was made to substitute a unique labor contract with a degree of employment protection increasing with tenure to the existing open-end and fixed-term contracts. Using survey data, this paper analyzes the social support for this contrat de travail unique (CTU). Contrary to the prediction of insider/outsider theories, support for the CTU comes from insider groups, whereas most outsider groups oppose it. This result may be the consequence of the job protection increasing with tenure. This mechanism could reinforce certain types of market segmentation instead of abolishing employment precariousness.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Amable, 2014. "Who wants the Contrat de Travail Unique? Social Support for Labor Market Flexibilization in France," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01067934, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01067934
    DOI: 10.1111/irel.12070
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    Cited by:

    1. Normann Rion, 2019. "Waiting for the Prince Charming: Fixed-Term Contracts as Stopgaps," Working Papers halshs-02331887, HAL.
    2. Bruno Amable, 2014. "The unsolved contradictions of the modernists. Economic policy expectations and political crisis in France 1978-2012," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00973926, HAL.
    3. Guillaud, Elvire & Marx, Paul, 2013. "Preferences for Employment Protection and the Insider-Outsider Divide," IZA Discussion Papers 7569, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Thomas Prosser & Giga Giorgadze, 2018. "Towards a theory of illiberal dualisation? Conceptualising new employment and social policy divisions in Poland and the United Kingdom," Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, , vol. 24(2), pages 151-162, May.
    5. Nils BRAAKMANN & Bernd BRANDL, 2021. "The performance effects of collective and individual bargaining: A comprehensive and granular analysis of the effects of different bargaining systems on company productivity," International Labour Review, International Labour Organization, vol. 160(1), pages 43-64, March.
    6. Brigitte Granville & Jaume Martorell Cruz, 2016. "Squared Segmentation: How the Insider/Outsider divide across Public/Private Employment shapes attitudes towards markets," Working Papers 78, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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