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Who wants the Contrat de Travail Unique? Social Support for Labor Market Flexibilization in France

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  • Bruno Amable

    () (PSE - Paris School of Economics, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, CEPREMAP - Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications, IUF - Institut Universitaire de France - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche)

Abstract

In France, a proposal was made to substitute a unique labor contract with a degree of employment protection increasing with tenure to the existing open-end and fixed-term contracts. Using survey data, this paper analyzes the social support for this contrat de travail unique (CTU). Contrary to the prediction of insider/outsider theories, support for the CTU comes from insider groups, whereas most outsider groups oppose it. This result may be the consequence of the job protection increasing with tenure. This mechanism could reinforce certain types of market segmentation instead of abolishing employment precariousness.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Amable, 2014. "Who wants the Contrat de Travail Unique? Social Support for Labor Market Flexibilization in France," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01067934, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01067934
    DOI: 10.1111/irel.12070
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01067934
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2002. "The Political Economy of Employment Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 672-701, June.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:99:y:2005:i:01:p:61-74_05 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Bruno Amable & Lilas Demmou & Donatella Gatti, 2011. "The effect of employment protection and product market regulation on labour market performance: substitution or complementarity?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(4), pages 449-464.
    4. Bruno Amable & Ken Mayhew, 2011. "Unemployment in the OECD," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 207-220.
    5. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "Why are European Countries Diverging in their Unemployment Experience?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 49-68, Fall.
    6. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2000. "The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198293323.
    7. Bean, Charles R, 1994. "European Unemployment: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(2), pages 573-619, June.
    8. Dean Baker & Andrew Glyn & David Howell & John Schmitt, 2002. "Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment: A Critical Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence," SCEPA working paper series. SCEPA's main areas of research are macroeconomic policy, inequality and poverty, and globalization. 2002-17, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
    9. David N. F. Bell & David G. Blanchflower, 2011. "Young people and the Great Recession," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 241-267.
    10. Howell David R. & Baker Dean & Glyn Andrew & Schmitt John, 2007. "Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Review of the Evidence," Capitalism and Society, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-73, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elvire Guillaud & Paul Marx, 2013. "Preferences for employment protection and the insider-outsider divide," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00965174, HAL.
    2. Brigitte Granville & Jaume Martorell Cruz, 2016. "Squared Segmentation: How the Insider/Outsider divide across Public/Private Employment shapes attitudes towards markets," Working Papers 78, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contracts; labor contract;

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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