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Fairness Spillovers – The Case of Taxation

  • Thomas Cornelißen


    (University College, London)

  • Oliver Himmler


    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)

  • Tobias Koenig


    (Hannover University, Department of Economics)

It is standardly assumed that individuals react to perceived unfairness or norm violations in precisely the same area or relationship where the original offense has occurred. However, grievances over being exposed to injustice may have even broader consequences and also spill over to other contexts, causing non-compliant behavior there. We present evidence that such 'fairness spillovers' can incur large economic costs: A belief that there is unfairness in taxation in the sense that the rich don't pay enough taxes is associated with a twenty percent higher level of paid absenteeism from work.

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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2012_17.

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Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_17
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