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Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Pereyra

  • Alvaro Forteza
  • Irene Mussio

Abstract

If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pereyra & Alvaro Forteza & Irene Mussio, 2023. "Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 2303, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
    • Handle: RePEc:mnt:wpaper:2303
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E69 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Other
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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