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The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality

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  • Marina Agranov
  • Thomas R. Palfrey

Abstract

We explore the effect of income mobility and the persistence of redistributive tax policy on the level of redistribution in democratic societies. An infinite-horizon theoretical model is developed, and the properties of the equilibrium tax rate and the degree of after-tax inequality are characterized. Mobility and stickiness of tax policy are both negatively related to the equilibrium tax rate. However, neither is sufficient by itself. Social mobility has no effect on equilibrium taxes if tax policy is voted on in every period, and tax persistence has no effect in the absence of social mobility. The two forces are complementary. Tax persistence leads to higher levels of post-tax inequality, for any amount of mobility. The effect of mobility on inequality is less clear-cut and depends on the degree of tax persistence. A laboratory experiment is conducted to test the main comparative static predictions of the theory, and the results are generally supportive.

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Agranov & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2016. "The Effects of Income Mobility and Tax Persistence on Income Redistribution and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 22759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22759
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jiménez-Jiménez, Natalia & Molis, Elena & Solano-García, Ángel, 2020. "The effect of initial inequality on meritocracy: A voting experiment on tax redistribution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 380-394.
    2. Pogorelskiy, Kirill & Traub, Stefan, 2017. "Skewness, Tax Progression, and Demand for Redistribution : Evidence from the UK," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 29, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    3. Natalia Jiménez Jiménez & Elena Molis & Ángel Solano García, 2019. "Why do the poor vote for low tax rates? A (real-effort task) experiment on income redistribution," ThE Papers 19/11, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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