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Social Identity and Electoral Accountability

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  • Dimitri Landa
  • Dominik Duell

Abstract

In a laboratory experiment, we explore the effects of group identities on the principal‐agent relationship between voters and representatives. In an adverse selection framework with observable effort, voters can choose to condition their reelection choices on representatives' effort alone, beliefs about representatives' competence, or both of those jointly. We show that inducing social identities increases the weight of representatives' effort in voters' reelection decisions. Further, when voters and representatives share a social identity, representatives tend to invest less effort and their effort is independent of their competence. In contrast, “out‐group” representatives compensate for lower competence with higher effort and reduce effort when voters are likely to perceive them as competent. Voters often adopt laxer retention standards for representatives who are fellow group members and are responsive to evidence of other‐regardingness from out‐group representatives, but some voters actively resist treating representatives with shared identity more favorably and “overcorrect” as a consequence.

Suggested Citation

  • Dimitri Landa & Dominik Duell, 2015. "Social Identity and Electoral Accountability," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(3), pages 671-689, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:3:p:671-689
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12128
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    Cited by:

    1. Müller, Daniel, 2019. "The anatomy of distributional preferences with group identity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 785-807.
    2. Forteza, Alvaro & Mussio, Irene & Pereyra, Juan S., 2024. "Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    3. Duell, Dominik & Valasek, Justin Mattias, 2017. "Social identity and political polarization: Evidence on the impact of identity on partisan voting trade," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2017-304, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Duell, Dominik & Valasek, Justin, 2019. "Political polarization and selection in representative democracies," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 168, pages 132-165.
    5. Dewan, Torun & Wolton, Stephane, 2019. "A Political Economy of Social Discrimination," MPRA Paper 94394, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Jean-Robert Tyran & Alexander K. Wagner, 2016. "Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting," Discussion Papers 16-12, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    7. Adelaide Baronchelli & Alessandra Foresta & Roberto Ricciuti, 2020. "The Words That Keep People Apart. Official Language, Accountability and Fiscal Capacity," CESifo Working Paper Series 8437, CESifo.
    8. Dominik Duell & Justin Mattias Valasek, 2018. "Social Polarization and Partisan Voting in Representative Democracies," CESifo Working Paper Series 7040, CESifo.
    9. Daniel Müller, 2017. "The anatomy of distributional preferences with group identity," Working Papers 2017-02, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, revised Mar 2017.

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