The Problem of Prevention
Many disasters are foreshadowed by insuficient preventive care. In this paper, we argue that there is a true problem of prevention, in that insu¢ cient care is often the result of rational calculations on the part of agents. We identify two factors that lead to dubious e¤orts in care. First, when objective risks of a disaster are poorly understood, positive experiences may lead to an underestimation of these risks and a corresponding underinvestment in prevention. Second, redundancies designed for safety may lead agents to reduce their care, resulting in a decrease in safety under certain conditions. We also analyze the use of checklists in accident prevention
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Prudencio de Pena 2440, Montevideo 11600|
Web page: http://www.um.edu.uy/cee/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dubra, J., 1999. "Overconfidence in Search," Working Papers 99-10, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Gollier, Christian, 2002. "Optimal Prevention of Unknown Risks: A Dynamic Approach with Learning," IDEI Working Papers 139, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mnt:wpaper:1111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mercedes Ponce de León)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.