Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Ladislava Grochova & Tomas Otahal, 2012. "Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories," ACTA VSFS, University of Finance and Administration, vol. 6(2), pages 136-154.
More about this item
KeywordsBureaucracy; corruption; economic efficiency; Chicago Public Choice; Virginia Public Choice; rent-seeking; rule of law;
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- P3 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2012-07-08 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2012-07-08 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2012-07-08 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-07-08 (Positive Political Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:men:wpaper:24_2012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luděk Kouba). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/femencz.html .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .