IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Investability, Corporate Governance and Firm Value

  • Thomas O'Connor

    ()

    (Department of Economics Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland, Maynooth)

In this paper, I show that “investable premia” are greatest for transparent, well-governed firms. I find that single-class share investable firms and better-governed firms reap the largest valuation gains from becoming investable. Dual-class share firms do gain from becoming investable, but their gains are much lower than that of single-class share firms. These findings suggest that the failure on the part of firms to remedy agency conflicts prior to becoming investable only serves to greatly reduce, or even nullify their “investable premia”.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repec.maynoothuniversity.ie/mayecw-files/N223-12.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth in its series Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series with number n223-12.pdf.

as
in new window

Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n223-12.pdf
Contact details of provider: Postal: Maynooth, Co. Kildare
Phone: 353-1-7083728
Fax: 353-1-7083934
Web page: http://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/economics-finance-and-accounting
More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Mundlak, Yair, 1978. "On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 69-85, January.
  2. Francis E. Warnock & Hali J. Edison, 2001. "A Simple Measure of the Intensity of Capital Controls," IMF Working Papers 01/180, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Chiang, Yi-Chein & Ko, Chun-Lein, 2009. "An empirical study of equity agency costs and internationalization: Evidence from Taiwanese firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 369-382, September.
  4. Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & BRUCE C. PETERSEN, 1988. "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 141-206.
  5. Doidge, Craig & Andrew Karolyi, G. & Stulz, Rene M., 2007. "Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 1-39, October.
  6. Christian Leuz & Karl V. Lins & Francis E. Warnock, 2010. "Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms?," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Governance National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Bae, Kee-Hong & Goyal, Vidhan K., 2010. "Equity market liberalization and corporate governance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 609-621, December.
  8. Kim, Bonghoon & Kenny, Lawrence W., 2007. "Explaining when developing countries liberalize their financial equity markets," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 387-402, October.
  9. Craig Doidge & G. Andrew Karolyi & Rene M. Stulz, 2001. "Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?," NBER Working Papers 8538, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Anusha Chari & Peter Blair Henry, 2004. "Risk Sharing and Asset Prices: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1295-1324, 06.
  11. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control," Working papers 440, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  12. Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey, 1997. "Foreign Speculators and Emerging Equity Markets," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 79, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  13. Mitton, Todd, 2006. "Stock market liberalization and operating performance at the firm level," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 625-647, September.
  14. Ronald B. Davies & Delia Ionascu & Helga Kristjánsdóttir, 2007. "Estimating the Impact of Time-Invariant Variables on FDI with Fixed Effects," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp228, IIIS.
  15. Michael R. King & Dan Segal, 2006. "The Long-Term Effects of Cross-Listing Investor Recognition, and Ownership Structure on Valuation," Working Papers 06-44, Bank of Canada.
  16. Durnev, Art & Kim, E. Han, 2004. "To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-7, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  17. Geert Bekaert & Campbell R. Harvey & Christian Lundblad, 2000. "Emerging Equity Markets and Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 7763, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Nandini Gupta & Kathy Yuan, 2009. "On the Growth Effect of Stock Market Liberalizations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(11), pages 4715-4752, November.
  19. Reena Aggarwal & Leora Klapper & Peter D. Wysocki, 2003. "Portfolio preferences of foreign institutional investors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3101, The World Bank.
  20. Bae, Kee-Hong & Bailey, Warren & Mao, Connie X., 2006. "Stock market liberalization and the information environment," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 404-428, April.
  21. Harvey, Campbell R. & Lins, Karl V. & Roper, Andrew H., 2004. "The effect of capital structure when expected agency costs are extreme," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 3-30, October.
  22. Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, 2007. "Explaining Differences in the Quality of Governance Among Companies: Evidence from Emerging Markets," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 19(1), pages 16-24.
  23. Singh, Manohar & Davidson III, Wallace N., 2003. "Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 793-816, May.
  24. McKnight, Phillip J. & Weir, Charlie, 2009. "Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 139-158, May.
  25. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2005. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," NBER Working Papers 11280, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Lensink, Robert & van der Molen, Remco, 2010. "Does group affiliation increase firm value for diversified groups?: New evidence from Indian companies," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 332-344, June.
  27. Doidge, Craig & Andrew Karolyi, G. & Stulz, Ren M., 2009. "Has New York become less competitive than London in global markets? Evaluating foreign listing choices over time," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 253-277, March.
  28. Dilip K. Patro, 2005. "Stock Market Liberalization and Emerging Market Country Fund Premiums," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 135-168, January.
  29. James S. Ang & Rebel A. Cole & James Wuh Lin, 2000. "Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 81-106, 02.
  30. Ross Levine & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2005. "Internationalization and the Evolution of Corporate Valuation," NBER Working Papers 11023, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Kling, Gerhard & Weitzel, Utz, 2011. "The internationalization of Chinese companies: Firm characteristics, industry effects and corporate governance," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 357-372, September.
  32. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 1985. "Managerial ownership of voting rights : A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 33-69, March.
  33. Henry, Peter Blair, 2000. "Do stock market liberalizations cause investment booms?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 301-334.
  34. Lins, Karl V., 2003. "Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 159-184, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n223-12.pdf. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.